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LIST OF PARTIES 
Nancy Madsen - Plaintif&Appellant. Nancy Madsen, along with her 
husband Richard Madsen, was the obligor on a mortgage loan that was owed to 
Prudential Federal Savings and I oan \ ssociation I he Madsens later divorced, and Mr. 
Madsen has since passed away. Thus, Ms. Madsen is the sole representative of the class 
In connection with this loan, the Madsens paid amounts to Prudential for a reserve 
accoiint for the payment of taxes and insurance on the property that secured the loan. 
2. Washington Mutual Bank, fsb Ddaidanl \ppclln; mid Cross-Appellant 
Washington Mutual Bank is the successor-in-interest to Prudential Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, the holder of a mortgage loan made to Richard Madsen and Nancy 
Madsen. 
Because the pleadings throughout the history of this case usually refer to "Madsens" in 
the plural, Prudential has continued to use that designation in this brief, though Nancy 
Madsen is the sole class representative. 
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Washington Mutual Bank, fsb, successor in interest to Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, ("Prudential"), the Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant in 
Appellate Procedure. 
I STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
I In: I "urn I has juiisdidion over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0(2001). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR CROSS-APPEAL AND 
CORRESPONDING STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Statement of Issue: 
Did the district court err in determining that federal regulations do not preclude all 
claims for interest on reserve accounts, or, in the alternative, all such claims after July 16. 
1975? 
Standard of Review. This issue is governed b\ 1n (' P R §§ 5-1 S,6-1 I (c), 554.1, 
and 541.5. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness, affording 
no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. R.A. McKellExcavating, Inc. v. 
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 100 P 'VI 1 1 ^ , I 1M (I 'tali ?0(M I 
2. Statement of Issue: 
Did the district court err in excluding Prudential's evidence on the issue of 
whellinr mn "special agiccniPiif1 cxistol rct^ircling ihc use of any pledged monies? 
Standard of Review. Because the trial court excluded evidence based on its 
interpretation of the prior Utah Supreme Court Decision in this case, that interpretation is 
uestionoflaw reviewed for correctness. Jensen v. ItIC Hasp • nc, K2 P id 10 76, 
# (Utah 2003). 
Statement of Issue. 
Did the district court en' in i ompuunding I In: interest awarded to the Madsens and 
111 plaintiff class? 
Statement of Review. Entitlement to prejudgment interest is a question of law, 
villi ih is reviewed for" correctness. / \>(*n v ttwton^ ;S l\\d d 16, b U> (Utah 2000). 
Statement of Issue. 
Did the district court err in granting class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), 
I hen linn I\J'I iiu hki. liliood if inconsistent judgments in this case? 
Standard of Review. Because Prudential does not challenge any factual findings 
but raises only the proper application of the rules, this is a legal issue reviewed for 
correctness. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801, 813 (Utah 2004). 
m . CONSTITUTIONAL ANI> ST ATI I'M >KY AUTHORITY 
The issues presented on appeal are generally governed by common law. In 
addition, the issues presented on appeal and cross-appeal regarding the payment of 
interest on mortgage reserve accounts are governed by 12 C.F.R. ^§ 545,6" I lie), '"o4,I 
and 541.5 (attached as Addendum 1) and by Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4 (attached as 
Addendum 2). 
2 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1
 Nature of the Case. 
Nancy and Richard Madsen ("Madsens") si led Pn idential seeking to reco\ ei 
interest or earnings on amounts paid into a reserve account (or budget account) 
maintained to pay taxes and insurance on the property securing their mortgage loan. 
Pn identia 1 dispi itedthat any profits were earned on the money, and disputed any 
obligation under the law or the parties' contractual agreement to pay any such interest or 
earnings to Madsen. 
B. Course of Proceeding and Disposition of Case in the Trial Court. 
1. In 1975, Madsens filed this action seeking recovery of interest or earnings 
on amounts paid into a reserve account (or budget account) maintained for the purpose oi 
pa> ing taxes .ILHI ti isunn u t m • I he property securing their mortgage loan. 
2. In 1976, the trial court granted Prudential's Motion,, for Si immary Judgment 
dismissing Madsens' claims, and denied Madsens' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Madsens appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded, but 
did not direct (h; i( Madsen' niolion He JL'T'HIII '..I, Set MacLst n v. Prudential Fed Say. & 
Loan Ass % 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977) (hereafter "Madsen F). 
3. On July 13,1977, the trial court entered an Order conditionally certifying a 
class IIIUJH I llith K'tiic oH 'ivii IVotvdiire 2Mh)( 1 )( \ i R. h Hi 41 
4. ' On July 28, 1977, Madsens filed their Second, \ mended ('oinplumt. 
R. 647-53. Prudential removed the case to the United States District Court for the 
I> • •• .772-77. 
5. On April 19, 1979, Judge Aldon Anderson of the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential, 
dismissing Madsens' claims because certain federal regulations prohibited Prudential 
from paying interest or earnings on a reserve account. R. 3602-06. 
6. Madsens appealed the federal court ruling. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, not on the merits but solely for lack of federal 
jurisdiction because a "federal question" was not presented on the face of the complaint 
but existed only in defense. See Mads en v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'rc, 635 F.2d 
797 (10th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981). 
7. In 1979, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Interest on Mortgage Loan 
Reserve Accounts Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-17-1 to -10 (the "Reserve Account Act"). 
Consistent with the Reserve Account Act, Prudential (as did other Utah mortgage 
lenders) gave borrowers, including Madsens, the option either to continue paying into a 
non-compensated reserve account or to pay taxes and insurance directly without a reserve 
account. Thereafter, any borrower who continued to pay into a non-compensated reserve 
account did so voluntarily. 
8. On October 14,1981, Madsens filed their Substitute Third Amended 
Complaint (Class Action) (the present complaint) which alleged a class that was defined 
differently than both that alleged in the original complaint and that described in Judge 
Croft's 1977 Order of Conditional Certification. R. 974-1000. 
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9. On September 3, 1985, on the eve of trial of Madsens' individual claim, tl 
trial court, on its own motion, entered an Order "on the effect of the Supreme Court's 
ruling in this case (dated January 14, 1977)." R. 2026-28. In that Order, the trial court 
(1) prohibited evidence on the issue of whether compensation was intended by the partit 
and the purposes for the reserve account; (2) construed the trust deed and ruled that the 
"budget payments" paid by Madsens constitute a common law pledge, thereby limiting 
the trial to the sole issue of determining whether Prudential "has earned any profit from 
the use of the pledged funds, and if so, for an accounting of those profits;" and 
(3) "reconfirmed" Judge Croft's conditional certification order. R. 2026-27. 
10. On September 4-6,1985, trial was held before Judge Kenneth Rigtrup on 
Madsens' individual claim only, with all class issues being reserved. R. 2994, 3003. 
11. After trial, Prudential moved to disqualify Judge Rigtrup because he 
disclosed, on the eve of trial, that he was a class member. R. 2064-65. Prudential's 
motion was granted. R. 2239. Madsens appealed (R. 2325-44), and that order was 
reversed. See Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. &LoanAss'n, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988). 
12. On March 22, 1990, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on Madsens' individual claim only, again concluding that "[a]ll clasj 
issues are reserved for further proceedings." R. 3003. Madsens were awarded damages 
of $134.70, plus interest at 10% per annum from the date of trial to the entry of judgment 
Id. The Court fixed the damage recovery period from March 3, 1971 (four years before 
the Complaint was filed) to June 30,1979 (the date after which Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-17-
-5-
1 to -10 became effective and the date on which Prudential no longer required reserve 
payments on most trust deeds, including Madsens'). R. 3002. By Memorandum 
Decision dated January 30,1998, Judge Stirba ruled that the granting of interest from the 
date of the trial to the date of entry of judgment was erroneous. R. 6794. 
13. On April 30, 1992, the trial court entered an Order and Judgment on the 
Madsens' individual claim in the amount of $134.70, plus interest. R. 3408. 
14. The April 30,1992, Order and Judgment ordered, at the Madsens5 request, 
the appointment of a special master ("Special Master") to survey Prudential's records to 
determine the most feasible method for identifying class members and for identifying 
records from which a computation of damages can be made for them. R. 3405-06. 
15. On December 2 and 3, 1996, Judge Rigtrup heard various motions, 
including motions relating to the scope and definition of the class. Judge Rigtrup 
confirmed the class consistent with the definition pleaded by Madsens in their Substitute 
Third Amended Complaint as, among other things, "single-family, owner-occupied, 
residential primary residence borrowers who had any funds in escrow reserve budget 
accounts during the period March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979," R. 5522 at 3, and to loans 
that originated in the State of Utah or seeking to remove the Special Master or the Judge. 
R. 5533 at 12. 
16. From December 1996 (when Judge Rigtrup retired) to the time of entry of 
final judgment as to the class, Madsens filed numerous motions, including over thirty 
(30) motions challenging the class definition, challenging the damages calculation, 
-6-
seeking to expand the damages period adopted by the trial court, or seeking removal of 
the Special Master, all of which were denied. R. 11055-60. 
17. From December 1996 to the time of entry of final judgment, Madsens file 
nine petitions for interlocutory appeal or writs of mandamus, all of which were denied. 
R. 11062. 
18. Final Judgment was entered in this matter on June 1,2006. R. 13842-44. 
Madsens filed a Notice of Appeal on June 28, 2006. R. 13850-83. Prudential filed its 
Notice of Cross Appeal on July 12, 2006. R. 13890-93. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Prudential's cross-appeal seeks a ruling that Madsens9 common law claim for 
interest on their mortgage loan reserve account is barred by federal regulations governinj 
Prudential which prevent Madsens' claim. On this basis, Madsens' claims were stricken 
by the United States District Court for the District of Utah in 1979, prior to this case 
being remanded to state court for lack of jurisdiction. Alternatively, the federal 
regulations terminate any claim for damages as of June 1975. 
Prudential's cross-appeal also seeks a ruling that the trial court incorrectly relied 
on Rule 23(b)(1)(A) in certifying a class. Prudential's cross-appeal also seeks a ruling 
that the trial court improperly included compound interest in the damages awarded 
Madsens. Finally, Prudential's cross-appeal seeks a ruling that the trial court erred in 
prohibiting evidence that would support a finding that Madsens and Prudential had a 
"special agreement" contrary to the payment of the interest on the mortgage loan reserve 
-7-
account. Thus, by its cross-appeal, Prudential seeks an order dismissing Madsens' claims 
and striking the class allegations. Alternatively, Prudential seeks an order remanding the 
case for determination of class issues and the existence of a "special agreement." 
If the Court denies Prudential's cross-appeal on these issues, Prudential urges 
affirmance of the trial court's rulings on statute of limitations issues, damage 
calculations, and class definition, thereby denying Madsens' appeal. 
The trial court correctly held that Madsens' equitable claim for an accounting is 
subject to the four year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). 
The trial court also correctly held that if any claim survived the federal regulations, the 
Utah Interest on Mortgage Loan Reserve Accounts Act, enacted in 1979, terminates any 
claim for damages. Prudential provided notice consistent with the statute, and the statute 
does not require interest after that notice. In any event, the notice informed Madsens that 
they could stop making reserve account payments and, if they continued, they would be 
without interest, thereby estopping the Madsens from claiming interest. 
The trial court correctly denied prejudgment interest. The amount of damages was 
determined in the broad discretion of the trial court, considering what assumptions might 
support the damages. 
The trial court's orders determining the definition of the class are consistent with 
Madsens' allegations in their Substitute Third Amended Complaint, and should not be 
overturned. 
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Madsens' numerous attempts to remove the Court-appointed Special Master were 
correctly denied by the trial court. 
VL ARGUMENT 
A. Madsen I Did Not Mandate the Result Madsens Now Seek, 
Madsens incorrectly argue that the 1977 decision in Madsen I established the 
statute of limitations (Brief of the Appellants (hereafter "App. Br.") at 10); the 
inapplicability of the 1979 statute, App. Br. at 13; the issue of pre-judgment interest, 
App. Br. at 19; the calculation of damages to include compound interest, App. Br. at 21; 
and the class definition. App. Br. at 26. However, Madsens5 simplistic argument is not 
supported by the Madsen I opinion, and is contrary to the way in which each trial judge in 
this case has interpreted that decision. Indeed, Madsens' argument requires this Court to 
find erroneous, and thus overrule, each key finding of fact and conclusion of law entered 
by the trial court—as well as the trial court's denial of the more than thirty motions 
subsequently filed by the Madsens in the past seventeen years—to alter those findings 
and conclusions. 
In 1975, Prudential moved for summary judgment explaining that under similar 
facts the vast majority of courts had expressly held on either a motion to dismiss or on 
summary judgment that the lender has no obligation to account or pay earnings on the 
reserve funds as a matter of law. Madsens filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
2
 In the mid-1970's, numerous cases were filed throughout the country seeking interest on 
mortgage loan reserve accounts. The overwhelming majority of reported decisions 
rejected the various theories presented by the plaintiffs. See e.g., Gibson v. First Fed. 
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Judgment "on the issue of defendant's liability reserving the amount of plaintiff s 
damages for trial." R. 428. The trial court granted Prudential's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Madsens' cross-motion. R. 479-80. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It did not grant 
Madsens' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, but found that factual issues 
prevented the granting of Prudential's Motion. Indeed, on appeal, Madsens argued for 
reversal on the basis of the existence of factual issues. R. 1736-65. 
The holding in Madsen I is aptly summarized in the official syllabus of the Utah 
Supreme Court which reads, in relevant part: 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 364 F. Supp. 614 (ED. Mich. 1973), affd, 504 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 
1974); Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'I Bank, 353 F. Supp. 1072 (WD. Pa. 1973), affd, 487 F. 
2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973); Manchester Gardens, Inc. v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 205 
F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Umdenstock v. Am. Mortgage & Inv. Co., 363 F. Supp. 1375 
(WD. Ok. 1973); Zelickman v. Bell Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass 'n., 275 N.E. 2d 300 (111. 
App. Ct. 1971); Brooks v. Valley Nat'lBank ("Brooks F), 539 P.2d 958 (Ariz. App. Ct 
1975), vacated, Brooks v. Valley Nat'l Bank ("Brooks IF), 548 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. 1976); 
Surrey Strathmore Corp. v. Dollar Sav. Bank of New York, 325 N.E. 2d 527 (N.Y. 1975); 
Richman v. Security Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 204 N.W. 2d 511 (Wise. 1973); Durkee v. 
Franklin Sav. Ass'n., 309 N.E.2d 118 (111. App. Ct. 1974); Yudkin v. Avery Fed. Sav. 
Loan Ass 'n., 507 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. App. Ct. 1974); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (ED. Pa. 1973); Petherbridge v. Prudential Sav. &Loan 
Ass'n, 79 Cal. App. 3d 509 (1978); Kronisch v. Howard Sav. Inst, 392 A.2d 178 (N. J. 
Super. Q. 1978); Tierney v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 83 Misc. 2d 855, 373 N.Y.S. 
2d 724 (1975); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, AM S.W. 2d 725 (Ark. 1972); 
Cole v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 370 Ohio Misc. 56 (1973); Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. 
Bank ^ Carpenter IF), 346 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 1976). Kronisch, Carpenter II and Brooks 
II summarize the history of the litigation at that time. But see Derenco v. Benjamin 
Franklin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n., 557 P.2d 427 (Ore. 1978) and Madsen I. 
At the time of the decision in Madsen I, Article VIII, § 26, of the Constitution of Utah 
provided: "It shall be the duty of the [Supreme] Court to prepare a syllabus of all the 
points adjudicated in each case, which shall be concurred in by a majority of the judges 
thereof, and it shall be prefixed to the published reports of the case." The holding of the 
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The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., entered summary 
judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, 
Jr., held that fact issue whether payments were pledged property existed, thus 
precluding summary judgment. Reversed and remanded. 
Madsen, 558 P.2d at 1338 (emphasis added). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court held that if 
the trial court had considered the pledge theory, questions of fact would have precluded 
summary judgment. Madsen I did not reverse the trial court's denial of the Madsens' 
motion for partial summary judgment, but said, if "from the use of a pledge, profits are 
derived, then " . . . pledgee must, in the absence of a special agreement, account for 
them." Madsen, 558 P.2d at 1340. Madsen I did not determine whether there was such a 
"special agreement," did not rule on the applicable statute of limitations, did not rule on 
the applicability of a 1979 statute that was not yet in existence, did not rule on the issue 
of pre-judgment interest or the calculation of damages, did not rule as to the definition of 
the class and did not rule on any of Prudential's affirmative defenses. Thus, Madsens' 
interpretation of Madsen I is inaccurate. 
B. Federal Regulations Governing Prudential Preclude All Claims for Interest 
on the Reserve Account 
Madsens' claims are barred because federal regulations governing Prudential (as a 
federal savings and loan association) preclude all claims for interest on the reserve 
account, and those regulations preempt conflicting state law. 
court and the specific issues it resolved in the case should be ascertainable by reading the 
syllabus. Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 105 P.2d 347, 350 (1940). 
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1. Under the Supremacy Clause. Federal Regulations Precluding 
Payment of Interest on Reserve Accounts Preempt Madsens' State Law 
Claims, 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution suspends any state law 
that either falls within an area exclusively occupied by federal law or actually conflicts 
vs »th federal law. U.S. CONST., Art. VI, cl. 2; see also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 
U S. 151, 157-58 (1978); Fidelity Fed Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 
152(1982). 
In this case, the Supremacy Clause operates to preempt all state law that is not 
consistent with the Home Owners9 Loan Act of 1933 ("HOLA"), which created a system 
of federal savings and loan associations and granted broad regulatory authority over the 
operation of these federal associations to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the "Bank 
Board"). See 12. U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976). The Bank Board was empowered to "provide 
for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation" of the federal 
savings and loan associations. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 145. Because of the broad power 
granted to the Bank Board in HOLA, state laws that conflict with the Bank Board's 
regulations are preempted. See id. (holding that Bank Board regulation permitting 
enforcement of due-on-sale clauses preempted California State law prohibiting same).4 
4
 See Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the Bank Board's regulations governing ATM fees preempted state laws on 
same subject); Fed. Home Loan BankBd. v. Empie, 778 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that Bank Board regulation permitting use of the word "bank" in advertising by 
federal loan associations preempted Oklahoma State law prohibiting same); Conference 
of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'ns. v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[t]he broad 
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Among the Bank Board's regulations is a 1975 regulation that confirmed existing 
law and explicitly controlled the payment of interest on reserve accounts maintained by 
federal savings and loan associations. The regulation provided: 
A Federal association which makes a loan on or after June 16, 1975, on the 
security of a single-family dwelling . . . shall pay interest on any escrow account 
maintained in connection with such a loan (1) if there is in effect a specific 
statutory provision or provisions of the State in which such dwelling is located by 
or under the State-chartered savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks 
and similar institutions are generally required to pay interest on such escrow 
accounts, and (2) at not less than the rate required to be paid by such State-
chartered institutions . . . . Except as provided by contract, a Federal association 
shall have no obligation to pay interest on escrow accounts apart from the duties 
imposed by this paragraph 
12. C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) (1976) (emphasis added). Under this provision, for loans made 
after June 16,1975, a federal savings and loan must pay interest only if required by a 
specific state statute. For all other loans, a federal association has "no obligation to pay 
interest on escrow accounts," "except as provided by contract." Id. 
The "no obligation" clause of this regulation applies to loans entered into before or 
after June 16,1975 and merely clarified prior law on the topic. Two long-standing 
regulations provided no payment of interest on reserve accounts. See 12 C.F.R. § 544-1 
(a) and (b) (1975) (federal savings and loan associations are "not required to distribute 
earnings on short-term savings accounts") and 12 C.F.R. § 541.5 (1975) (defining "short-
term savings account" to include "a savings account in a federal association established 
for the purpose of accumulating funds to pay taxes or insurance premiums, or both, in 
regulatory authority over the federal associations conferred upon the Bank Board by 
HOLA does wholly preempt the field of regulatory control over these associations.") 
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connection with a loan on the security of a lien on real estate.").5 Because the 1975 
regulation merely clarified existing law, and did not alter that law, it applies to loans 
entered into prior to 1975. See First Fed, Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 
417,425-26 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that Massachusetts law requiring federal associations 
to pay interest on reserve accounts more broadly than federal regulations, including 
interest on duplexes and a loan made before June 16,1975, was in direct conflict with 
federal regulations and therefore preempted by federal law); see also Kinee v. Abraham 
Lincoln Fed. Sav. &LoanAss% 365 F.Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (practice of not 
paying interest on mortgage loan reserve accounts "is specifically authorized by the 
regulations of the Home Loan Bank Board.")6 Madsens' loan falls into this category, 
meaning that Prudential "ha[d] no obligation to pay interest on escrow accounts55 except 
as required by contract. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c). Here there is no contractual provision 
s
 12 C.F.R. § 545.5 and 544.1(a) and (b) were codified in 1958. See 23 Fed. Reg. 9890, 
9893 (December 23, 1958). 
612 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 was recodified in 1979 at section 548.3. See 44 Fed. Reg. 39128 
(July 3, 1979, as amended at 44 Fed. Reg. 57386 (Oct. 5, 1979)). HOLA regulations 
were then substantially amended in 1983 as a result of the Garn-St Germain Depository 
Institutions Act of 1982, which deregulated the savings and loan industry. See 48 Fed. 
Reg. 23032. Subsequent regulations continue to preempt state law concerning payments 
on mortgage escrow accounts. See, e.g., Flagg v. Yonkers S&L Ass 'n. FA, 307 F. Supp. 
2d 565, 576 (S.D.N. Y. 2004) (stating that New York statute requiring payment of interest 
on mortgage loan reserve account was preempted by HOLA and its regulations), ajfd, 
396 F.3d 178 (2nd Cir. 2005), cert, denied, 126 S.Ct. 343 (2005); Wise. League of Fin. 
Insts., Ltd. v. Galecki, 707 F. Supp. 401 (W.D. Wise. 1989) (holding that Wisconsin 
statue requiring interest on mortgage escrow accounts was preempted by HOLA 
regulations as to federal associations. 
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requiring the payment of interest on Madsens' reserve account, and Madsens' claim is 
barred by the federal regulations. 
2. Judge Aldon Anderson of the U.S, District Court for the District Of 
Utah Correctly Held in this Case that Federal Regulations Preclude 
Madsen's Claims, 
When this case had been removed to federal court, Judge Aldon Anderson adopte 
this reasoning and granted Prudential's motion for summary judgment dismissing 
Madsens' claim and stating that "the court is persuaded that Madsens' claim against 
Prudential is wholly without merit." R. 3603. Judge Anderson summarized the 
preemption issue as follows: 
Under the federal preemption doctrine, Madsens have no claim against Prudential 
for interest on their escrow account. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) clearly precludes th< 
relief the Madsens are seeking. That regulation is not subject to attack under the 
theory that it retroactively abrogates vested rights. There is no assurance that, 
under state law, Madsens at any time had any kind of right, much less an 
inviolable vested right, to receive interest on the escrow funds. More importantly 
the regulation cited above does not appear to alter the federal law applicable to 
loans made before June 16, 1975, but instead appears to reaffirm the impact of 12 
C.F.R. §§ 544.1 ("association is not required to distribute earnings on short-term 
savings accounts") and 541.5 (defining short-term savings account as including 
mortgage loan escrow accounts for taxes and insurance). 
R. 3604. 
Although Judge Anderson's ruling was reversed, it was reversed solely on the 
grounds of jurisdiction. See Madsen v. Prudential Fed, Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 635 F.2d 797 
801 (10th Cir. 1980). His substantive analysis of the underlying issue remains sound. 
Under federal regulations, Prudential is not, and never has been, obligated to pay interest 
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on Madsens' escrow account, and Madsens' claim should have been summarily 
dismissed by the trial court. 
3. The 1977 Supreme Court Decision Did JNot Decide this Issue, 
The decision in Madsen I did not decide the issue of federal preemption. As stated 
more fully in Section VIA, supra, that decision reversed and remanded summary 
judgment in favor of Prudential due to the existence of factual issues. The decision in 
Madsen I did not address any issues of federal preemption, or any other affirmative 
defenses that could be raised by Prudential, but merely held that the "essential elements 
of a pledge" existed, and remanded for further proceedings. See Madsen, 558 P.2d at 
1339-40. Thus, the law of the case established by Madsen I is, at most "that the budget 
payments constitute 'pledged' property under the law and are to be so treated in the 
proceedings that must follow." R. 633. 
"The law of the case doctrine specifies that when a legal decision is made on an 
issue during one stage of a case, that decision is binding in successive stages of the same 
litigation." Jensen v. IHCHosp., Inc., 82 P.3d 1076,1091 (Utah 2003) (quotations 
omitted). Importantly, "[t]he law of the case doctrine does not bar a later court from 
considering matters that 'could have been, but were not, raised and resolved in the earlier 
proceeding.5" Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1989) {quoting Signal 
Oil & Gas Co. v. Barge W-701, 654 F.2d 1164, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 
U.S. 944 (1982). "[W]hen further proceedings follow a general remand, the lower court is 
free to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate issued by the higher court." 
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Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n. Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 705 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 119 P.3d 302 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005) (^Dunlap IF), a quiet title action, is instructive on this issue. The trial court 
initially granted summary judgment in favor of Dunlap based on the chain of title 
established by a 1941 foreclosure and denied Dunlap's motion for summary judgment or 
its adverse possession claim. See Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 16 
P.3d 711, 713 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) ("Dunlap F). Mayflower appealed and the Court oi 
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that "Mayflower's chain of title . . . is superior 
to that of the Dunlaps." Id. at 715. After remand, Mayflower argued that Dunlap /had 
effectively resolved all issues and mandated that the trial court simply quiet title in 
Mayflower. Dunlap II, 119 P.3d at 303 . In Dunlap II, the Court of Appeals held that 
though the decision in Dunlap I determined that Mayflower's chain of title was superior 
to Dunlap's, the decision "did not foreclose the possibility that the Dunlaps may 
challenge Mayflower's preeminent status as record title holder on such legal theories as 
adverse possession " Id. at 305; see also Gaddis Inv. v. Morrison, 289 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1955), (reversing and remanding because the trial court had not made findings 
concerning whether the broker had abandoned its rights leaving open the possibility that 
the trial court "could reasonably find that there either was or was not an abandonment.") 
Schoneyv. Memorial Estates, 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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In the present case, the preemption issue was not addressed or decided in the 
opinion in Madsen L The trial court ruling granting summary judgment that was 
appealed did not mention federal preemption. R. 475-76,479-80. Indeed, Prudential's 
brief on appeal in Madsen I did not mention the word 'preemption.' R. 17'66-92. 
Prudential's brief merely cited to the 1975 federal regulation in its Statement of Facts, 
and in its Argument section under the heading "Social Considerations Mitigate Against 
Plaintiffs' Claim." R. 1771-72. Similarly, Madsens' brief in reply did not discuss 
preemption. R. 1798-1808. The Utah Supreme Court did not address the issue. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court's reversal and remand in Madsen I did not order 
judgment in favor of Madsens, but merely reversed summary judgment that had been 
granted in favor of Prudential on the basis that Madsens' pledge theory created factual 
issues. Madsen I did not rule on any of Prudential's affirmative defenses, including 
federal preemption. 
C. The Trial Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Supreme Court's Decision in 
Madsen I Causing it to Improperly Exclude Evidence of a "Special 
Agreement" Regarding the Use of the Pledged Monies. 
In Madsen I9 the Utah Supreme Court stated that a pledgee has a duty to account 
for profits from the use of a pledge "in the absence of a special agreement to the 
contrary." Madsen, 558 P.2d at 1340 {citing Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co,, 76 P.2d 
234 (Utah 1938)). The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Madsen 7, and improperly excluded the introduction of evidence of a "special 
agreement" between Prudential and Madsens. "Whether a trial court correctly interpreted 
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a prior judicial opinion is a question of law that we review for correctness." Jensen v, 
IHCHosp., Inc., 82 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Utah 2003). 
The trial court, interpreting Madsen I, prohibited Prudential from presenting an; 
evidence on whether the parties had a "special agreement" that profits not be paid and 
any evidence concerning the reasons Prudential maintained reserve accounts. R. 2030-
31. That evidence would have included the testimony of Richard Madsen in which he 
testified that he knew when he executed the trust deed that (a) it required monthly budj 
payments, R. 1703-04 at n. 6; (b) Prudential would not pay interest or earnings on the 
budget payments, id.; (c) he thought this unfair but did not discuss this with Prudential, 
id.; and (d) he paid the monthly budget payments beginning in 1964 without expectatio 
that Prudential would pay interest or earnings. Id. This evidence could have supported 
finding that a "special agreement" existed contradicting a claim for interest. The trial 
court's interpretation of Madsen I as prohibiting the introduction of evidence of a specie 
agreement contradicting the claim for interest was plainly incorrect. 
D. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Class Certification Under Rule 
23(b)(1)(A). 
The trial court erred in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). Under Rule 
23(b)(1)(A), a class can be certified only if the "prosecution of separate actions... could 
create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications.. .which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct" for Prudential. Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 
The nature of Madsens' claim, combined with the history of this case, establish 
that no risk exists of inconsistent rulings which would establish incompatible standards. 
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Firsts if potential class members are small claimants, with little or no practical incentive 
i > pursue a claim, there is no risk of inconsistent adjudications. See Eisen v. Carlisle & 
queline, 391 F.2d 555, 559, 564 (2nd Cir. 1968) (finding that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) did not 
apply to claims of a class alleging price-fixing because the individual claimants could not 
afford the expense of a complex antitrust suit, so there was little danger of suits that 
would establish "incompatible standards of conduct.") 
Second, even if there were the possibility of multiple damages suits, there is no 
risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications in this case because a "judgment that 
defendants were liable to one plaintiff would not require action inconsistent with a 
judgment that they were not liable to another plaintiff. By paying the first judgment, 
defendants could act consistently with both judgments." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
S. Dist. Ct., S.D. ofCal., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, Flanagan v. 
Donnell Douglas Corp., 425 U.S. 911 (1976). See also Nat'I Union v. Midland 
Bancor, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 687 (D. Kan. 1994) (denying certification under Rule 
23(b)(1)(A) and explaining that "National Union is claiming that if there were separate 
suits, it might win some and lose others. As stated above, class certification under 
23(b)(1)(A) is not intended to address this type of risk."). 
Third, the thirty-year history of this case establishes that there is no risk of 
multiple suits. No notice of this class action has been given to any class member, and no 
other class member besides Madsens has asserted a claim against Prudential. The trust 
deed form containing the pledge language was last used by Prudential in connection with 
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new loans in 1973. Moreover, evidence submitted by Prudential in 1985 demonstrates 
that, when given the option, over 70% of Prudential's borrowers chose to maintain a non-
compensated reserve account. R. 1866. Thus, the prospect of varying adjudications has 
been proven by the passage of time to be imaginary. 
The trial court's order improperly certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) must 
be vacated. The improper certification, combined with no notice to class members, has 
prevented class members, who are also, by definition, shareholders of the mutual savings 
association, from opting out of the class. 
F, The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Madsens' Claim is Subject to a Four-
Year Statute of Limitation, 
The trial court correctly ruled that the four year statute of limitations applicable to 
actions "for relief not otherwise provided for by law," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3), 
governs this case. R. 3002. 
1. Madsens' Claim is on an Implied Contract and the Four-Year Statute 
Applies. 
The trial court correctly held that Madsens' claim is a claim on an implied 
contract, which is subject to the four-year statute of limitations. Madsens incorrectly 
assert that "the mandate of the Supreme Court clearly and specifically holds that 'this 
action' was 'founded5 on 'an instrument in writing,'" and that as a result, alternatively, 
this action is governed by the six year statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-
23. App. Br. at 12. The trial court correctly rejected this argument and concluded that 
"[tjhis case is an action for an accounting in equity." R. 3002. 
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Madsens do not allege a written contract to pay interest, but rather argue the effect 
of a common law pledge. Madsens' claim is not forhreach of contract, but rather for 
"Accounting and Unjust Enrichment." R. 980. Madsens abandoned any breach of 
ontract claim by amending their complaint to eliminate such a claim. R. 647-53 (Second 
\m. CompL); R. 927-38 (Third Am. CompL); R. 974-1000 (Substitute Third Am. 
CompL)- Prior to this amendment, the 1977 decision in Madsen I confirmed that the 
Madsens' claim is not based on contract, but rather that it "is predicated on the theory 
that the monthly budget payments . . . constitute a common law pledge." Madsen, 558 
P.2datl339. 
In McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995), McKean sued to recover monies paid under a real estate contract. 
Under the contract, McKean's predecessor was entitled to partial release of some 
property upon payment. McKean sued to recover the money paid when the property was 
not released. According to the court: 
[the] contract provides no remedy in the event of Alpine's default or refusal to 
perform. Thus, McKean's right, if any, to recover the monies paid does not rest 
on the Alpine contract, but is implied in law. Because McKean's claims are not 
founded upon a written instrument, but rather upon an implied right to recover, the 
four-year statute of limitations period applies. 
Id. at 1318; see also Am. Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 761 (Utah 
1992) (claim for return of allegedly unlawful "impact fees" was equitable so that the 
four-year "catch-all" statute of limitations applied); Petty & Riddle v. Lunt, 138 P.2d 648, 
651 (Utah 1942) (stating that "where an action is brought to recover an excessive amount 
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paid - either under a written contract or other agreement - where there is no written 
promise to return said amount, []the action is founded on 'implied contract5 and the 
statute of limitations with reference to obligations not founded on a written instrument i 
applicable."); Brown v. Cleverly, 70 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah 1937) (holding that claim for 
return of monies paid on rescinded contract was subject to a four-year statute of 
limitations because the claim did not arise from the written instrument but upon an 
implied promise, created by law, of defendants to repay the purchase money paid if the) 
should default in the performance of the written instrument); see also CIG Exploration, 
Inc. v. HilU 824 F.Supp. 1532,1546 (D. Utah 1993) (applying Utah law and stating that 
claims for mistake, restitution/unjust enrichment, monies had and received, and 
overpayment to recover excess royalties paid arise from equitable theories of implied an 
quasi-contract subject to the four-year statute of limitations). 
Here, though Madsens refer to the Trust Deed as a written pledge agreement, thei 
right to an accounting, if any, is not based on any provision of the Trust Deed because 
there is no promise in the Trust Deed for Prudential to provide an accounting. Thus, the 
Madsens request for an accounting is at best a right implied at law arising from the 
pledgor/pledgee relationship. Madsens' equitable claim for an accounting is subject to 
the four-year statute of limitations and not the six year statute of limitations. 
2. The Statute of Limitations for Recovery of a Bank Deposit is 
Inapplicable to Madsens9 Claim for Interest on Escrowed Funds. 
Madsens alternatively contend that there is no applicable statute of limitations 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-34 (now repealed) because their claim to interest on the 
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budget account should be construed as a claim to recover a bank deposit. App. Br. at 15. 
However, the trial court correctly rejected the Madsens' argument, holding that "[t]he 
'budget5 account is not a bank 'deposit' within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
34." R. 3003. 
First, the budget payments are not "bank deposits" because they are not subject to 
withdrawal by the borrower. Cases from other jurisdictions that are factually similar to 
Madsens' claim have ruled that mortgage escrow payments are not "deposits." See 
Kronisch v. HowardSav. Inst, 392 A.2d 178, 182 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1978) (explaining that 
a deposit is money that can be withdrawn by the depositor, or, in other words, is "subject 
to the order" of the depositor, while tax escrow payments are not); Sears v. First Fed 
Sav. and Loan, 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971) (holding that tax escrow payments were 
not deposits because "one attribute of a deposit is that the depositor retains a right, 
generally, under stated circumstances, to receive back all or part of the deposit, or its 
equivalent, quite analogous to the rights of a creditor."); Durkee v. Franklin Sav. Ass'n, 
309 N.E.2d 118 (111. App. Ct. 1974) ("mortgage agreement is devoid of any language that 
would allow them to receive back any or all of their monthly partial tax and insurance 
payments"). See also State v Parker, 872 P.2d 1041,1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (money 
paid by a prisoner to participate in a rehabilitative program was not a "deposit" within the 
meaning of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 28 because "Defendant paid the 
money in order to participate in the program with no understanding that it would be 
returned."). Here, Madsens had no right to withdraw any budget payments they made. 
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Rather, they made payments for a specific purpose without the right to withdraw these 
monies, and withdrawal is contradictory to the "pledge" of those payments as security fo: 
the debt. 
Second, Madsens are not seeking the "deposits" they paid into the reserve accounl 
as budget payments. The "deposits" were paid out years ago in the form of tax and 
insurance payments, with an annual accounting provided to the Madsens. Rather, 
Madsens' action seeks an accounting of interest or earnings on the budget payments, not 
the budget payments themselves. See Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 
772, 776 (Utah 1983) ("Moreover, the policy behind § 78-12-34 is to protect persons wh< 
have deposited money in a bank account from being barred from claiming that money 
years later.") (emphasis in original)). 
Third, Conner v. Smith, 51 Utah 129, 169 P. 158 (1917), relied on by Madsens, 
merely analyzed when the statute of limitations begins to run, but expressly declined to 
determine which statute of limitations applied to a claim to recover two pledged rings. 
Id. at 161 ("[i]t is not necessary that we should definitely decide this question [of whethei 
the Legislature intended any particular limitation, or whether it should be the general 
limitation period]... It is sufficient to say that whether the action should have been 
commenced three or four years, or might have been brought at any time, in view of the 
facts in this case, it was commenced in time."). 
Fourth, Madsens' argument that Madsen I determined that the budget payments 
were bank deposits is not supported by Madsen I The passage cited by Madsens merely 
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ates that money can be pledged as security. See Madsen 558 P.2d at 1339. Madsen I 
did not purport to determine any applicable statute of limitation, or to analyze whether 
the pledged money constituted a bank deposit under the now repealed statute relied on by 
Madsens. 
The trial court correctly held that Madsens' claim is subject to the four-year statute 
of limitations. 
The Trial Court Correctly Held that Any Claim for Damages Terminated in 
1979. 
As stated above, Prudential contends that Madsens' claims are barred by federal 
regulations. To the extent any claim survived the effect of these regulations, that claim 
terminated on July 1,1979 as a result of notice given to Madsens consistent with state 
law. 
1. The Reserve Account Act Applies to Madsens' Claims After July 1. 
1979. 
The trial court correctly held that the Madsens' damages claim was terminated in 
1979, when the Utah Interest on Mortgage Loan Reserve Accounts Act (the "Reserve 
Account Act") was enacted (now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-1 to -10). The clear 
legislative intent of the Reserve Account Act was to establish rules governing all reserve 
accounts: 
7-17-1. Legislative Intent. It is the intent of the legislature that the provisions of 
this act govern the rights, duties and liabilities of borrowers and lenders with 
respect to reserve accounts established before and after the effective date of the 
act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-1 (emphasis added). 
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The Reserve Account Act had two principal effects. First, it limited recovery ar 
established a statute of limitations for actions claiming compensation on amounts paid 
into reserve accounts prior to the July 1, 1979 effective date of the Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-17-9. Subsection (9) of the Act provides that for reserve accounts established 
prior to July 1, 1979, and for which no legal action is pending as of January 1,1979, nc 
action lies for interest on amounts held in reserve accounts prior to July 1, 1979, unless 
specific agreement existed requiring payment of interest and the limitations period for 
such an action would be June 30, 1981. See id. Second, the Reserve Account Act also 
created clear rules from that time forward regarding compensation on amounts paid intc 
reserve accounts after July 1,1979, whether or not the reserve account was in existence 
before or after the date of the Act. Subsection (3) of the Act states the requirements for 
paying interest on reserve accounts "in connection with an existing or future real estate 
loan." See id. Subsection (4) of the Act describes the options required of lenders to 
implement the Act in relation to existing and future loans. Under the statute, if a lender 
does not require a reserve account, the lender simply has to inform the borrower of this, 
and give the borrower two options {e.g., either to pay into a non-compensated reserve 
account or to self-manage payment of taxes and insurance without a reserve account). 
See id. The Act clearly requires that a lender "shall give written notice of the options to 
the borrower (i) with respect to real estate loans existing on the effective date by notice 
mailed not more than 30 days after the effective date..." See id. "For real estate loans in 
-27-
existence on the effective date the borrower must select one of the options prior to 60 
days after the effective date." Id. 
Consistent with the Reserve Account Act, in July 1979, Prudential sent, and 
Madsens received, a letter informing them that a reserve account was no longer required 
and that any continued payments into the reserve account would be non-interest bearing. 
R. 3001. Based on this notice, and the Reserve Account Act, the trial court correctly 
concluded that any claim for interest or earnings on Madsens5 reserve account terminated 
on June 30, 1979 (the effective date of Prudential's notice). R. 3002. 
Madsens challenge this ruling, and point to two subsections of Section 10 of the 
Reserve Account Act, which they claim are inconsistent. Section 10 reads: 
The provisions of this Act shall apply: 
(1) to all reserve accounts; and 
(2) to all actions filed after January 1, 1979 to recover interest on or other 
compensation for the use of the funds in any reserve account whether or not 
the reserve accounts were established prior to or subsequent to July 1,1979. 
Utah Code Ann. §7-17-10. 
Madsens' argument was correctly rejected by the trial court on several occasions. 
The trial court rulings correctly give meaning to the entire statute. The trial court's 
n 
For example, Judge Stirba expressly addressed and ruled on the supposed inconsistency 
relied on by Madsens. Judge Stirba stated: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, when subparts (1) and (2) of Section 7-17-10 are 
read in conjunction with the express legislative intent of the act, they are not 
inconsistent. As stated in Section 7-17-1, "it is the intent of the Legislature that 
the provisions of this act govern the rights, duties and liabilities of borrowers and 
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rulings correctly construe subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-10 as meaning that 
the requirement to pay interest on required reserve accounts, or to provide the option of a 
non-interest bearing optional reserve account, applies "to all reserve accounts" from the 
effective date of the Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-17-3, 7-17-4, 7-17-10(1). This 
interpretation is consistent with the application of certain limitations on recovery and 
statutes of limitation which apply to actions to collect interest on amounts paid into 
reserve accounts prior to the effective date of the Act. See id. §§ 7-17-9, 7-17-10(2). 
Each provision of the statute is given meaning. 
Madsens9 reliance on statements made in the legislature when the Act was enactec 
is unavailing. The legislature's intent in enacting the Reserve Account Act is derived 
from the statutory language, and courts may look to legislative history only if the statute 
is ambiguous. Smith v. Price Dev. Corp., 125 P.3d 945, 949-50 (Utah 2005). Madsens 
have not shown that the statute is ambiguous. Even if ambiguous, Madsens' argument 
fails. Madsens cite a statement to the effect that the intention was for the Madsen case tc 
proceed to "logical conclusions." App. Br. at 16. The "logical conclusion" is that 
whatever claims Madsens had for compensation prior to the effective date of the Act 
would be resolved in the lawsuit, but that from the effective date forward, Madsens' 
rights and Prudential's responsibilities, like all other borrowers and lenders in the State c 
Utah, would be governed by the Act. Madsens' argument asks the Court to hold that 
lenders with respect to reserve accounts established before and after the effective 
date of this act." 
R. 6965. 
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prudential and its customers would be governed by a different set of rules after July 1979 
than all other lenders and borrowers in the state. That is not a "logical conclusion." 
Significantly, at the time of passage of the Reserve Account Act, Madsens' claims in this 
case had been summarily dismissed in the federal court, with no certified class of 
claimants in existence, and that ruling was on appeal. The trial court correctly interpreted 
the Reserve Account Act to give meaning to all its provisions. 
2. The Trial Court's Rulings Are Consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court Interpretation of the Act 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the Reserve Accounts Act cuts off 
damages claims after July 1,1979, if the lender sends the statutory notice (as did 
Prudential). In Nixon v. Am. Sav. &LoanAss'n, 635 P. 2d 24 (Utah 1981), the plaintiffs 
(represented by the same attorneys representing Madsens in this case) filed suit 
(apparently after June 30,1979) seeking to recover interest on a reserve account held at 
American Savings & Loan. The plaintiffs sued only for interest on amounts paid into the 
reserve account after June 30,1979, the effective date of the Reserve Account Act. The 
trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claim and the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed, based on the fact that the lender sent the required notice to the 
plaintiffs informing the plaintiffs of their option to discontinue the reserve account, or 
maintain a non-interest bearing account. The Utah Supreme Court explained: 
Contrary to the assertions of the plaintiffs, it is evident that it was the legislative 
intent to give to lenders of existing real estate loans the option of determining 
during the month of July 1979 whether they would require the continuation of a 
reserve account, and if the decision was made to require it, then 4% interest had to 
be paid. It clearly did not lock lenders into the payment of interest under existing 
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loans. As heretofore mentioned, the defendant promptly followed the statutory 
procedure in making its election by mailing out the required notice during July. 
The termination of the requirement of a reserve account was also authorized by tl 
trust deed which allowed the lender to waive in writing its continuation. 
Id. at 27. The interpretation of the Reserve Account Act made by the trial court is 
entirely consistent with the ruling in Nixon, supra. 
3. Prudential's Deposit of Reserve Payments in its Operating Account is 
Consistent with the Act 
Madsens argue that the Reserve Accounts Act required Prudential to deposit fiinc 
in a non-interest bearing account, and that Prudential did not do this when it deposited ti 
funds in its general operating account. See App. Br. at 15-17. This argument was 
correctly rejected by the trial court. First, Madsens' argument is not supported by the 
facts as found by the trial court. The trial court expressly found that Madsens made one 
combined monthly payment of principal, interest, tax and insurance, that Prudential 
deposited Madsens' payments in its general operating account, and that "Prudential 
maintained separate accounting records to credit Madsens for payment of principal, 
interest and 'budget' funds." R. 2998. The trial court also found that Prudential "invest! 
most surplus funds from the general operating account in short term investments such as 
U.S. Treasury Bonds " R. 2999. No evidence was presented to the trial court to 
establish that the general operating account is not a non-interest bearing account, and 
indeed the factual findings of the trial court imply that it is a non-interest bearing accoun 
with surplus funds being removed and invested in short-term bonds.8 
Madsens rely on the Conway Affidavit (which was submitted more than 10 years after 
Judge Rigtrup's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered) for their 
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Second, the reference in Prudential's letter to a non-interest bearing account does 
not require a separate, non-interest bearing bank account. The statute states that the 
"borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing reserve account to be serviced by 
the lender at no charge to the borrower." Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4(l)(a). In this context, 
use of the word "account" can be read in the same meaning as if a person has an 
"account" with the electric utility. It refers to the credits and debits of the parties' 
obligations rather than a deposit account. 
4. The Form of Prudential's Notice Complied with the Act 
The trial court correctly ruled, on multiple occasions, that Prudential's notice 
complies in all respects with the Reserve Account Act, rejecting Madsens' argument that 
the notice does not state it was sent "pursuant to the Act." Prudential's notice states: 
While Prudential is governed by Federal and not State law in matters dealing with 
the terms of a loan contract, the options as set forth herein are consistent with the 
provisions of Utah Law. 
R. 990. 
This statement is completely consistent with the Utah statute, and is similar to the 
notice found effective by the Utah Supreme Court in Nixon. Neither the notice in Nixon 
nor the notice in this case cited to "Utah Code 7-17-4," because the statute had not yet 
been codified when Prudential sent its notice in July 1979. R. 11105-07. Rather, the 
argument that the monies were not deposited in a non-interest-bearing account. The trial 
court correctly granted Prudential's motion to strike the Conway Affidavit, striking all of 
the Conway Affidavit except "statements on accounting procedures." R. 12771. Mr. 
Conway's purported factual statement or conclusion regarding where Prudential 
deposited the funds cannot be considered a statement of accounting procedures. 
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Nixon notice referred to Senate Bill 85, and likewise Prudential's notice referred to "state 
law" and stated that the options "are consistent with the provisions of Utah Law." Both 
notices are sufficient to alert the borrower that there is Utah law on the subject and that 
the notice is given consistent with Utah law, even though Prudential is governed by 
federal law. 
5. The Madsens9 Claim was Cut Off on July 1,1979, Even Without 
Reference to the Act 
The trial court correctly ruled that even if the Madsens were able to raise an issue 
concerning the applicability of the 1979 Reserve Account Act, their claims were still cut 
off as of July 1,1979. As the trial court found, it is undisputed that the Madsens receive* 
Prudential's 1979 notice informing them that their reserve account was no longer 
required and that, if Madsens chose to continue their reserve account, it would be non-
interest bearing. R. 3001. Because the Madsens knew that the reserve account was no 
longer required, and then continued to make payments into the reserve account, they 
waived claims and failed to mitigate any damages they could now claim for post-July, 
1979 payments. As Judge Rigtrup explained: 
THE COURT: You may make an offer of proof. My ruling is still the 
same. My ruling is predicated upon the fact that Prudential sent notices to all 
account holders saying, "we are not going to keep your money unless you can 
consent to us not paying interest, and we are not going to charge you. Or in the 
alternative you can take your money." 
They had an opportunity, whether by statute or by an act of God or 
whatever, they got a specific notice saying that they could take their money. And 
they all had an opportunity to mitigate damages. 
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And based on that notion, then the Court is concluding that they can't 
simply sit there, having been given the opportunity to mitigate damages, 
notwithstanding the earlier filing of a lawsuit, and let the damages run. They, as a 
matter of common law, must mitigate damages. And on that notion, and that 
notion alone, I so rule. 
R. 3717 at pp. 292-93. 
With or without the 1979 Reserve Accounts Act, Prudential informed borrowers 
that reserve accounts were no longer required and that voluntary payments into a reserve 
account would be without interest or compensation. The Madsens are barred from 
asserting a claim for damages or earnings because they failed to mitigate damages but 
rather voluntarily paid into the non-required reserve account. See Turner v. General 
Adjustment Bureau, 832 P.2d 62, 66, n.3 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, Turner v. Norton, 
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) ("a complaining party is not entitled to recover damages from 
wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or minimized by reasonable means."); 
mdAngelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (same). 
6. Federal Law Cut Off Madsens' Claim At Least As of 1975. 
As stated above, federal regulations governing Prudential preempt any state law 
that would have required Prudential to pay interest on reserve accounts. See 12 C.F.R. 
§ 545.6-11(c). That regulation, enacted in 1975, merely clarified existing regulations. 
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 554.1 and 541.5. At a minimum, these regulations make clear that after 
1975, Prudential, as a federal savings and loan association, was required to pay interest 
on reserve accounts only as required by contract. See Derenco v Benjamin Franklin Fed. 
Sav. and Loan Ass % 511 P.2d 477, 496 (Ore. 1978) (holding that 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 
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terminated any obligation of a federal savings and loan association to pay interest or 
earnings on a reserve account after June 16, 1975, for all loans, whether entered into 
before or after June 16, 1975). 
G. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Prejudgment Interest 
1. The Decision to Deny Prejudgment Interest is a Mixed Question of 
Law and Fact 
In challenging the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest, Madsens allege that 
the trial court "incorrectly applied the law to these facts" so that, on review, this Court 
should apply a "correctness" standard of review. App. Br. at 21. However, "when the 
trial court applies the facts of the case to the law then the question is a mixed question of 
fact and law, and the factual basis underpinning the decision is subject to a clearly 
erroneous standard." Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 133 P.3d 428, 436 (Utah 2006) 
(affirming denial of prejudgment interest). Thus, while a trial court's decision as a whole 
to award prejudgment interest may be a question of law reviewed for correctness, the 
court's factual determinations resulting from the application of law to the facts - such as 
a finding that damages are not fixed as of a particular time - are reviewed under the 
higher "clearly erroneous" standard. 
The "factual basis underpinning" the trial court's decision was the finding that 
damages were not fixed as of a particular time because they were "not calculable before 
trial" (R. 3003), which finding the Madsens themselves specifically refer to as a "factual 
characterization." App. Br. at 21. Therefore, this Court must apply the "clearly 
erroneous" standard in determining whether the trial court's decision that damages were 
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not calculable before trial is consistent with Utah law. Madsens have failed to meet this 
"burden and have failed to marshal all the evidence and demonstrate that the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the trial court's ruling on this issue. See Wilson Supply, 
Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177, 1183 (Utah 2002). 
2. The Denial of Prejudgment Interest is Consistent with Utah Law and 
Should Not be Disturbed on Appeal, 
The trial court correctly rejected Madsens' claims for prejudgment interest. This 
Court explained in Lefavi v. Bertoch 994 P.2d 817, 823 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) that "a 
court may only award prejudgment interest if damages are calculable within a 
mathematical certainty" and further explained that: 
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they must be 
ascertained in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of 
value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount rather than be 
guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past as 
well as for future injury " 
Id. (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the "we deny awards of 
prejudgment interest in cases where damages amounts are to be determined by the broad 
discretion of the [trier of fact]." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1069 (Utah 
2003). 
In this case, the amount of damages was determined in the broad discretion of the 
trial court. In determining the amount of "profit," if any, that Prudential realized from the 
Madsens' budget funds, the trial court heard conflicting expert testimony. Prudential's 
expert testified that there was no profit and based his opinion on evidence and 
assumptions concerning the costs and expenses associated with monitoring reserve 
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accounts, and paying taxes and insurance. See, e.g., R. 3717 at 119-121, 135-138. 
Madsens' expert presented three different theories of profits and based his conclusions < 
various estimates and assumptions concerning Prudential's operations as a whole and 
investment opportunities and expenses of Prudential as a whole, without reference to tb 
costs and expenses associated with administering the reserve account. See, e.g., R. 371' 
at 388-89, 441, and 447. Madsens' expert conceded that the ultimate decision was in th 
discretion of the trial court. R. 3717 at 388-89. Judge Rigtrup, faced with differing 
assumptions and conclusions, chose in his best judgment which assumptions to accept. 
R. 3717 at 501-07. He then found that prejudgment interest was not appropriate since 
"damages required a determination by the Court and Q the Court was required to select 
one method of calculation from among several alternatives presented by the experts." R 
3003-04 (emphasis added). Thus while 'these estimates were a reliable enough basis fo 
awarding damages, the assumptions used to arrive at those estimates are by no means tb 
only way to arrive at [] damages." Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 85^  
P.2d 1030, 1042 (Ct. App. 1993) (denying prejudgment interest on damage award), rev\ 
on other grounds, 884 P.2d 1236 (Utah 1994). Here, the trier of fact was guided by his 
"best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed," which demonstrates that the 
damages in this case were not based on fixed rules of evidence and known standards of 
value and were not calculable with mathematical certainty, and the denial of prejudgmen 
interest is not clearly erroneous. 
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In support of their argument, Madsens cite to Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 
1064, 1070 (Utah 2003). Smith is factually distinguishable from the present case in that it 
Involved assessing damages based on the fair market valuation of real property. Smith, 
82 P.3d at 1069. The Supreme Court explained that two of its previous cases interpreting 
the prejudgment interest standard had already held that "fair market valuations of real 
property are within the category of damages upon which prejudgment interest may 
properly be awarded." Id. Thus, Smith was a case dealing with settled law and involving 
a category of damages that the Supreme Court had already determined were entitled to 
prejudgment interest. 
The present case does not involve any such category of damages. Rather, it 
involves a situation where damages were "ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact at 
trial," which is a case in which "prejudgment interest is not allowed." Id. at 1069 n.5 
{citing Corina v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)).9 The trial court correctly 
applied Utah law to the facts of this case and denied prejudgment interest. 
9
 See, e.g., Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379,1387 (Utah 1995) (affirming denial of 
prejudgment interest on damages for breach of a pasture agreement, though damages 
were calculated at $715 per cow and approximately $400 per calve based on conflicting 
expert testimony regarding the cattle's expected pregnancy rates, weight range, mortality 
rates and market prices); Canyon Country Stores v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 
1989) (denying prejudgment interest on lost profit damages); Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. 
St. Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030, 1042 (Utah Ct App. 1993) (denyingprejudgment 
interest on lost profits); and James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 
665, 673 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (denying prejudgment interest on an award of attorney's 
fees that required a determination of reasonableness by the Court); compare Trail 
Mountain Coal Co. v. State of Utah, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996) (prejudgment interest on 
coal royalties based on rates in state regulations governing the lease) and Consolidation 
Coaly. State of Utah, 886 P.2d 514, 527 (Utah 1994). 
-38-
3. Prejudgment Interest Is Inappropriate on Madsens' Equitable Claim 
Madsens' claim is an equitable claim for an accounting (R. 3002), and Utah law 
does not permit prejudgment interest on equitable claims. See, e.g., Bellon v. Malnar, 
808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991) (no prejudgment interest on equitable claim for return of 
down payment to defaulting vendee where claim is of a "highly equitable nature" and tJ 
court "has discretion in determining the amount, if any, to be returned); Parents Agains 
Drunk Driving v. Gray stone Pines Homeowners' Ass % 789 P.2d 52, 59 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (holding provision in a contingency fee agreement was void as a matter of public 
policy, remanding, and stating that if there is no enforceable fee agreement, prejudgmei 
interest is improper, presumably because the attorneys have only an equitable claim). 
4. Madsen I Did Not Determine Prejudgment Interest 
Madsens contend that the denial of prejudgment interest was contrary to the UtaJ 
Supreme Court's mandate in Madsen I. This argument is without merit. The Madsens 
cite to a passage from Madsen I discussing the existence of a pledge, in general, and 
stating that the "amount [of the pledge] is ascertainable at any given time, and thus the 
lien is perfected as to amount." Madsen, 558 P.2d at 1339 (quoting United States v. 
Harris, 249 F. Supp. 221, 224 (W.D. La. 1966)). Madsen I quotes the Louisiana court 
merely to show that a deposit of money has been recognized as a pledge even though th 
amount of the pledge may vary. The cited passage says nothing about the amount of th 
loss that the Madsens may have suffered and certainly never held that such a loss was 
ascertainable in this case. Madsen I did not mandate any award of prejudgment interest 
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U. Compound Interest on the Damages Awarded is Inappropriate, 
The trial court erred in awarding compound interest as part of the damages 
awarded for the time period 1971 to 1979. The trial court correctly denied Madsens' 
request for compound interest before 1971 and after 1979. In determining damages, the 
trial court found the "difference between income and expenses on Exhibit A [to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law] represents profits or earnings which Prudential 
has realized by its use and investment of Madsens5 'budget funds.'" R. 3000. The trial 
court then stated that it is "appropriate under the facts of this case to compound on an 
annual basis... the compound earnings are included in Exhibit A." Id. 
Including compound interest as part of the damages awarded was in error. Simple 
mterest only is allowable, unless the parties have agreed to compound interest, and no 
such agreement exists in this case. In City ofHildale v. Cooke, 28 P.3d 697 (Utah 2001), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Moreover, we have previously held that 'compound interest is not favored by the 
law' and that, accordingly, interest on a judgment should be calculated simply 
unless agreed to otherwise by the parties. 
Id. at 707 {quoting Watkins & Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979)) 
Watkins & Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 613 (Utah 1979) was an action to collect 
attorney's fees in which the district court compounded interest annually on the unpaid 
amounts due. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court with 
directions to recalculate the interest at a simple interest rate. Id. at 616. See also Estate 
Landscaping and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 793 
P-2d 415, 420 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev9don other grounds, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992) 
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(trial court's compound interest award prior to judgment was reversed citing "the general 
judicial disfavor of interest on interest"); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 
P.2d 551, 555 (Ut. App. 1989) (compound interest "can be affirmed only if we conclude 
the parties expressly agreed to compound interest...."). 
Madsens' reliance on Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 111 P.2d 571 (Utah 1950) is 
misplaced. First, more recent cases of the Utah Supreme Court, cited above, clearly hold 
that compounding is inappropriate unless agreed to by the parties. Second, Farnsworth's 
award of interest was based on the agreement of the parties. The Utah Supreme Court 
explained that "the trial court erred in not prescribing the payment of interest as provided 
in the contract" Id. at 576. Third, the court in Farnsworth cites to, and bases its holding 
on the older case of Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 145 P. 1036 (Utah 1915). The Utah Supreme 
Court has since clarified that Jensen permitted compound interest because "the defendant 
promised to pay interest at specified times," so that failure to pay at the specified time 
created new debt. See Watkins & Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979). 
When "there is no promise to pay interest at a particular time," compounding is 
inappropriate. Id. Here, there is no agreement to pay interest at any specified time or 
amount and compound interest is inappropriate. 
Madsens' citation to the Restatement of Trusts is inapplicable because the present 
situation is not a trust. See App. Br. at 23. The trial court correctly found that no trust 
relationship existed in connection with the reserve account. See R. 3519 (see page 95 of 
the record index) ("The Court: It is a common law pledge that arose, debtor/creditor... 
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it was not a fiduciary duty.") This conclusion is consistent with Utah law which states 
fhat "[t]he relationship between an association and its account holders is that of debtor 
and creditor." Utah Code Ann. § 7-7-22. Significantly, in the first appeal of this case, 
Madsens expressly disavowed any trust theory, stating, "Madsen has not urged any trust 
theory in this court." See R. 1806. In other mortgage reserve account cases, the trust 
theory has been rejected. See e.g. Sears v. First Fed Sav. & Loan Assoc, 275 N.E.2d 
300, 305-06 (111. App. Ct. 1971) ("We must expressly reject plaintiffs argument that a 
trust is created because of the use of the word 'pledge' in the note."). 
Madsens argue for compounding by saying that Prudential earned a "double 
profit" by earning interest on the budget funds and interest on the mortgage loans. 
Madsens' argument is contrary to the damages Madsens asked for, and were awarded, at 
trial. Indeed, compounding of interest awards Madsens a double recovery. Madsens 
asked for interest or earnings on the budget funds. They could have alternatively asked 
for damages in the form of a reduction of their mortgage loan balance but did not. 
Madsens cannot be awarded both the interest earned and the benefit had the interest 
hypothetically been applied to reduce their mortgage loan balance. By asking for 
compound interest, Madsens ask for a double recovery. See R. 3075-76. Madsens' case 
is no different than any other case in which a plaintiff claims that money is owed, and 
under the clear case law in Utah, compound interest is disfavored and cannot be awarded 
absent a contract to that effect. 
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L The Trial Court Correctly Limited the Class to Single-Family, Primary 
Residence Loans, 
1. The Trial Court Defined the Class Consistent With Madsens' 
Complaint 
Madsens complain that the trial court limited the class to single-family, primary 
residence loans in the State of Utah even though this class definition is taken directly 
from Madsens' Substitute Third Amended Complaint. In that Complaint, Madsens alleg 
that they represent a class of people who borrowed money in Utah pursuant to trust deed 
identical to Madsens. R. 976. In the next paragraph Madsens also alleged a class as 
follows: 
Madsen is also a representative member of a class of borrowers who have made 
real estate loans in Utah with lenders in which the loan documents provide for a 
reserve account. The class is further defined as borrowers who have received a 
letter from a member of the defendant class stating in substance and effect that th 
reserve account set up by contract is no longer required and that the real estate 
loan is, therefore, governed by § 7-17-4 U.C.A. 
Id. 
Madsens' Substitute Third Amended Complaint further defines "real estate loan" 
as "a loan secured by an interest in real estate in this state containing only a single-
family, owner-occupied, residential structure constituting the primary residence of the 
borrower...." R. 975. Thus, the class definition adopted by the trial court was the clas 
definition pleaded by Madsens, R. 5522 at 3, and Madsens cannot now complain. 
2. In Defining the Class, the Trial Court Applied Rule 23, 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) and (4) state the prerequisites for a class 
action, including the requirement that "the claims ... of the representative parties are 
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typical of the claims ... of the class and ... the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class." The trial court found that Madsens 
represented a class of primary-residence borrowers, and that Madsens9 claims are not 
typical of, or representative of, a class of investment property borrowers: 
And the Court is persuaded that Mr. Madsen is the representative of the 
homeowners interest, not necessarily commercial or corporate interest, so 
the Court is persuaded that I ought to follow the definition as contained in 
the third - Substitute Third Complaint, single family, owner-occupied 
residential primary residence borrowers; borrowers from the State of Utah; 
borrower who had any funds in escrow reserve budget accounts during the 
period March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979. 
THE COURT: My reasoning between the non-occupied or the commercial 
kinds of loans is where they are either holding rental property or apartments 
or commercial kinds of loans, they may have an interest to go back and 
borrow more money. And so they'd be concerned with the relationship 
with Prudential in terms of being able to go back to the well. A homeowner 
probably isn't really going to consider it because you are trying to get the 
best deal you can and buy yourself a home. 
R. 5522-23 at 3,11-12. 
This decision of the trial court is reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. 
"Whether a case should be allowed to proceed as a class action involves intensely 
practical considerations, most of which are purely factual or fact-intensive." Reed v. 
Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1988). The trial court's factual determination 
concerning typicality and adequacy of representation, like all factual determinations, 
should be reviewed under the "deferential clearly erroneous standard." State v. Daniels, 
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40 P.3d 611, 617 (Utah 2002) (explaining that appellate courts "owe broad deference to 
trial courts engaged in a fact finding role."). 
3. No Notice of Dismissal Was Required When the Trial Court Defined 
the Class, 
Madsens incorrectly argue that the trial court erred by not sending notice of 
dismissal to excluded potential class members under Utah R. Civ. P. 23(e) when the cou 
defined the class as primary residence borrowers. App. Br. at 27. Madsen's argument i< 
without support because the ruling defining the class did not constitute a "dismissal" for 
purposes of Rule 23(e). See R. 5522. Indeed, modifying a class definition is commonly 
recognized as a means of avoiding, rather than effecting dismissal. See Davoll v. Webb, 
194F.3d 1116, 1146 (10*0^.1999). 
Even if the Court's definition of the class did constitute a dismissal of those not 
included in the class definition, Rule 23(e) did not require notice because the notice 
requirement applies to voluntary dismissals, not to dismissals ordered by the Court.10 
Rule 23(e) exists to provide a "check against settlement dynamics that may lead the 
negotiating parties . . . to give insufficient weight to the interests of at least some class 
members." In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1111 (10th Cir. 2001). 
No notice of dismissal was required under Rule 23(e) when the court fixed the class 
definition. 
In fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) was amended in 2003 to make this rule explicit. See Fed 
R. Civ. P. 23(e), 2003 Advisory Committee Notes. 
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j # The Trial Court Correctly Denied Madsens' Attempts to Remove the Special 
Master. 
The trial court correctly rejected the Madsens' repeated attempts to disqualify or 
remove the Special Master.11 
1. The Special Master's Conduct Was Proper and Consistent With the 
Express Authority Granted to Him. 
The trial court correctly rejected Madsens' argument that the Special Master 
engaged in inappropriate ex parte meetings with Prudential personnel, finding that the 
communications were fully within the Special Master's scope of authority, were known 
to Madsens and to the Court, and were required to fulfill the tasks given by the Court to 
the Special Master. The Special Master's duties, outlined by the Court's various orders, 
required the Special Master to communicate with Prudential personnel. Those duties 
included surveying and analyzing Prudential's loan records and overseeing Prudential's 
accounting. R. 3405-06 and 7816. As the Special Master explained, these duties 
"required the Master to meet with Prudential personnel, because they held the records we 
were to report on." R. 9701.12 The Special Master's communication with Prudential 
A summary of Madsens' motions to disqualify or remove the Special Master and the 
trial court's rulings is attached as Appendix VIL 
Indeed, the Special Master's First Report, dated February 22, 1995 expressly states: 
"We have met with Olympus Bank personnel. Based upon our discussions with them and 
our review of the available records, we report the following " R. 4224. In addition, 
at a hearing in which the Court instructed the Special Master concerning matters that 
would ultimately be contained in the Special Master's updated Second Report, dated 
December 31, 1996, the Special Master explained, in open court, "as I've looked at my 
records, it is necessary for me to reconvene with the representative of Prudential and to 
re-examine this sample that we \e done." R. 5521 at 9. 
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personnel was consistent with the duties given by the Court, was authorized by the Court, 
and was known to Madsens. 
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990), relied upon by Madsens, does not 
support Madsens' argument. Madsens cite Plumb for the proposition that the Master is 
akin to a "judicial officer" and therefore cannot communicate with the parties. However, 
the Plumb case dealt with a Special Master acting as a type of "commissioner" and 
analyzed communications between a judge and Special Master in that instance. Id. at 
743. In our case, the Special Master is acting as an examiner or court-appointed expert 
witness, as contemplated by Rule 53.13 Indeed, Judge Rigtrup assumed that the Special 
Master would, in some instances, be subject to cross-examination. R. 5520 ("And if 
that's not the way to handle the problem, then I'm going to look at the master and we 
need to have a hearing and get his report orally and on the record and go through his 
methodology and how many standard deviations from the mean and all the statistical 
analysis as to how accurate his conclusions are."). The Special Master's role required 
communication with Prudential personnel and the Special Master's conduct must be 
viewed in the context of the duties assigned to him. 
Under Rule 53, the term "master" "includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner." 
Danville Tobacco Assoc, v. Bryant-Buckner Assoc, Inc., 333 F.2d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 
1964) ("Master" was a misnomer.. .the Court chose him as an expert for its guidance. H 
was subject to questioning as a witness before and after his counseling advice to the 
Court."). United States v. Cline, 388 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1968) (the Court appointed 
"master was selected by the Court, quite advisably and altogether permissibly, as an 
expert.. .rather than one to perform the duties of a master as the law commonly knows 
that office.") 
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2. The Trial Court Properly Accepted the Master's Final Report 
Madsens argue that the Special Master's Report on which the Final Judgment is 
based is not final. App. Br. at 34. Madsens' argument incorrectly describes the scope 
and purpose of the Special Master's March 1, 2002 Report, which was to give to the 
Court "the Master's final statistical calculation of aggregate class damages." R. 10201. 
Indeed, Madsens argued in favor of such a statistical calculation of aggregate class 
damages and consented to the sample testing performed by the Special Master.14 R. 
9700. The Special Master's reference to further testing to be done relates to the 
anticipated time when class damages will be distributed to individual class members. See 
App. Br., Ex. H ("of course, as this matter progresses to the point where damages are 
distributed to class members, we will perform additional testing to confirm proper 
identification of class members and completeness of the database"). The trial court also 
correctly rejected Madsens' claim that the Master was required to file the 70,000 loan 
cards with the Court, stating that "[t]he Rule does not require that the Master file with the 
Court each and every document used in the statistical plan submitted to the Court." R. 
12766.15 
The Special Master reported to the Court: "[a]t a meeting with counsel of both plaintiff 
and defendant present, it was proposed and agreed that the Master would test the sample 
of 400 borrowers previously conducted by Prudential personnel, rather than perform a 
new sample." R. 9700. "Plaintiffs Counsel indicated this was acceptable to him, as long 
as our testing was done in an objective manner and there was adequate testing of the 
sample, or words to that effect." Id. 
Madsens state that "Madsen has never seen the 70,000 loan cards " App. Br. at 45. 
However, Madsens were given an opportunity to review the loan cards, but declined to do 
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Thus, the report was final for the purposes requested by the Court, and the trial 
court accepted the report as the basis for entering judgment. 
K. Madsens' "Short-Cut" is Not Supported By Law, 
Madsens argue that if their appeal is successful, the case will require remand, 
which would lead to "[a]nother trial, and perhaps another appeal, to resolve the . . . issues 
[which] could take five to ten years." App. Br. at 39. Based on this argument, Madsens 
make the remarkable suggestion that this Court should ignore the factual findings made 
by the trial court concerning damages, and simply apply a passbook savings rate to 
determine damages. App. Br. at 40. Such a suggestion is without basis and requires this 
Court to determine that the trial court's factual findings concerning damages were clearl] 
erroneous. See State v. Daniels, 40 P.3d 611, 617 (Utah 2002). 
Madsens5 reliance on Derenco, 557 P.2d 427 to support their "short-cut" 
argument is misplaced. In Derenco, the trial court, as finder of fact, adopted the 
passbook savings rate to measure damages. The Oregon appellate court did not overrule 
the trial court's factual determination of damages. Id In our case, the trial court 
determined damages at trial based on assumptions concerning Prudential's expenses anc 
income, as advocated by Madsens' expert at trial. See R. 3000. Madsens' "short-cut" 
argument asks the appellate court to overrule the trial court's factual findings based on 
so. At a hearing on January 15,2003, the trial court ordered Prudential to make all of tl 
relevant loan cards available to Madsens' counsel and then set another hearing after 
Madsens had had an opportunity to conduct their review. R. 13913 at 12-13. Although 
Madsens made appointments to do so, Madsens voluntarily cancelled those appointed] 
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the age of the case. The trial court's factual findings should not be overruled, unless 
clearly erroneous. Madsens have not met this burden. 
vn. CONCLUSION 
Madsens' appeal should be denied. Prudential's cross-appeal should be granted, 
and Madsens' claims dismissed based on federal regulations that bar Madsens' claims. 
DATED this V° day of May, 2007. 
MOYLE& DRAPER 
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and 
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without explanation, stating only that "we don't need to go down there [to review the 
loan cards]." R. 12359. 
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Chapter V—Federal Home Loan Bank Board §545.6-11 
addition thereto of section 14.1 and any 
Federal association which has a charter 
in any other form not inconsistent with 
the provisions of §§545.6 to 545.6-13, 
may, when authorized by its board of 
directors, make any loan after a qualified 
person designated by such board of di-
rectors shall "have submitted a signed 
appraisal of the real estate security and 
may make any insured or guaranteed 
loan on the basis of a valuation of the 
Teal estate security furnished to such 
Pederal association by the insuring or 
guaranteeing agency. 
[23 FJR. 9901, Dec. 23,1958] 
§ 545.6-10 Initial loan charges. 
No director, officer, or employee of a 
Federal association, and no person or 
firm regularly serving such association 
in the capacity of attorney-at-law, may 
receive from the association or from any 
other source any fee or other compensa-
tion of any kind in connection with the 
procuring of any particular loan from or 
by such association. Borrowers may be 
required to pay the necessary Initial 
charges in connection with the making of 
a loan, including the actual costs of title 
examination, appraisal, credit report, 
survey, drawing of papers, closing of the 
loan, and other necessary incidental 
services and costs in such reasonable 
amounts as may be fixed by the board of 
directors; such necessary initial charges 
may be collected by the association from 
the borrower and paid to any persons, 
including any such director, officer, em-
ployee, attorney or firm rendering such 
services: Provided, That no discount, re-
bate, or commission on any such charge 
may be received by any director, officer, 
or employee of a Federal association, or 
by any person or firm regularly serving 
such association in the capacity of attor-
ney-at-law, but such discounts, rebates, 
or commissions, when allowed as com-
pensation for services performed, may be 
received and retained by the association. 
Upon the closing of the loan, the asso-
ciation shall furnish the borrower a loan 
settlement statement showing in detail 
the charges or fees the borrower has 
paid or obligated himself to pay to the 
association or to any other person in 
connection with such loan; and a copy of 
such loan settlement statement shall be 
retained in the records of the association. 
[23 FJR. 9901, Dec. 23,1958] 
§ 545.6—11 Loan contract* 
(a) Required and authorized provi-
sions; Each loan shall be evidenced by 
note, bond, or other instrument and shall 
be secured by such security instrument 
as is in keeping with sound lending prac-
tices. The loan contract shall provide for 
full protection to the Federal association 
in accordance with applicable provisions 
of law, applicable governmental rules and 
regulations, and the Federal association's 
charter and bylaws. It shall be recorded 
and, among other protections, it shall 
provide specifically for full protection 
with respect to insurance, taxes, assess-
ments, other governmental levies, main-
tenance, and repairs. It may provide for 
an assignment of rents. Such Federal as-
sociation may pay taxes, assessments, in-
surance premiums, and other similar 
charges for the protection of its interest 
in the property on which it has loans; all 
such payments may, when consistent 
with the provisions of this part, be added 
to the unpaid balance of the loan, A Fed-
eral association may require life insur-
ance to be assigned to it by its borrowers 
as additional collateral for loans on the 
security of real estate; such association 
may advance premiums on any such life 
insurance and, when consistent with the 
provisions of this part, may add the 
premium so advanced to the unpaid bal-
ance of the loan. A Federal association 
shall keep a record of the status of taxes, 
assessments, insurance premiums, and 
other charges on all real estate on which 
such association has loans or which is 
owned by it. All loan instruments shall 
comply with applicable provisions of 
law, applicable governmental rules and 
regulations, and the Federal association's 
charter and bylaws. 
(b) Escrow accounts. A Federal as-
sociation may require that all or any por-
tion of the estimated annual taxes, as-
sessments, insurance premiums, and 
other charges on any loan be paid in ad-
vance to such association in addition to 
interest and principal payments on such 
loan, to enable the association to pay 
such charges as they become due from 
the funds so received. With regard to any 
loan on the security of a home made in 
whole or in part by the association, the 
association shall not require that the 
borrower— 
(1) Deposit in any escrow account 
which may be established in connection 
with such loan for the purpose of assur-
ing payment of taxes, assessments, in-
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§ 545.6-12 Title 12—Banks and Banking 
surance premiums, and other charges 
with respect to the property, prior to or 
upon the date of settlement, an ag-
gregate sum for such purpose in excess 
of— 
(i) m any jurisdiction where such 
charges are postpaid, the total amount 
of such charges which will actually be 
due and payable on the date of settle-
ment and the pro rata portion thereof 
which has accrued, plus one-twelfth of 
the estimated total amount of such 
charges which will become due and pay-
able during the twelve-month period 
beginning on the date of settlement, or (ii) In any jurisdiction where such 
charges are prepaid, a pro rata portion of 
the estimated charges corresponding to 
the number of months from the last date 
of payment to the date of settlement, plus 
one-twelfth of the estimated total 
amount of such charges which will be-
come due and payable during the twelve-
month period beginning on the date of 
settlement; or (2) Deposit in any such escrow ac-
count in any month beginning after the 
date of settlement a sum (for the pur-
pose of assuring payment of such 
charges) in excess of one-twelfth of the 
total amount of the estimated charges 
which will become due and payable dur-
ing the twelve-month period beginning 
on the first day of such month, except 
that in the event the association deter-
mines there will be a deficiency on the 
due date it may require additional 
monthly deposits in such escrow account 
of pro rata portions of the deficiency cor-
responding to the number of months 
from the date of the association's deter-
mination of such deficiency to the date 
upon which such charges become due and 
payable. (c) Payment of interest on escrow ac-
counts. A Federal association which 
makes a loan on or after June 16, 1975 
on the security of a single-family dwell-
ing occupied or to be occupied by the 
borrower (except such a loan for which 
a bona fide commitment was made be-
fore that date) shall pay interest on any 
escrow account maintained in connection 
with such a loan (1) if there is in effect a 
specific statutory provision or provisions 
of the State in which such dwelling is 
located by or under which State-char-
tered savings and loan associations, 
mutual savings banks and similar institu-
tions are generally required to pay in-
terest on such escrow accounts, and (2) 
at not less than the rate required to be 
paid by such State-chartered institutions 
but not to exceed the rate being paid by 
the Federal association in its regular ac-
counts (as defined in § 526.1 of this chap-
ter). Except as provided by contract, a 
Federal association shall have no obliga-
tion to pay interest on escrow accounts 
apart from the duties imposed by this 
paragraph. 
[40 FR 20942, May 14, 1975] 
§ 545.6-12 Loan payments. 
(a) Payments on monthly installment 
loans and flexible payment loans. Pay-
ments on all monthly Installment loans 
and flexible payment loans, other than 
construction loans, insured loans, and 
guaranteed loans, shall begin not later 
than 60 days after the advance of the 
loan. Insured loans and guaranteed loans 
may be repayable upon terms acceptable 
to the Insuring or guaranteeing agency. 
The Board hereby approves for use by 
any Federal association a loan plan 
whereby payments on any monthly in-
stallment loan or flexible payment loan 
which includes construction may begin 
not later than 36 months after the date 
of the first advance, but not later than 18 
months If the loan is secured by real 
estate consisting solely of one or more 
homes or combination of home and busi-
ness property; interest shall be payable 
at least semiannually until regular peri-
odic payments become due. 
(b) Loan payments and prepayments. 
Payments on the principal Indebtedness 
of all loans on real estate security shall 
be applied directly to the reduction of 
such indebtedness, but prepayments 
made on an installment loan may be 
reapplied from time to time in whole or 
in part by a Federal association to 
offset payments which subsequently ac-
crue under the loan contract. Each bor-
rower from Federal associations on a 
loan secured by a home or combination 
of home and business property shall have 
the right to prepay the loan without 
penalty unless the loan contract makes 
express provision for a prepayment 
penalty. The prepayment penalty for a 
loan secured by a home which is occupied 
or to be occupied in whole or in part by a 
borrower shall not be more than 6 
months' advance interest on that part of 
the aggregate amount of all prepayments 
made on such loan in any 12-month 
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§541.1 Title 12—Banks and Banking 
Sec. 
541.16 Guaranteed loan. 
541.18 Director. 
AUTHORITY: The provisions of this Fart 541 
Issued under sec. 5 ,48 Stat. 182, aa amended; 
12 UJ3.C. 1464, Reorg. Plan No. 8 at 1947; 8 
GFR, 1943-1948 Coxnp. 
§ 541.1 Board.. 
The term "Board" means the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board or one or more 
of its officials who has been duly author-
ized by the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board to act in its behalf. 
[23 FJEt. 9890, Dee. 23, 1958] 
§ 5 4 1 . 2 Federal association. 
The term "Federal association" means 
a Federal savings and loan association 
chartered by the Board as provided In 
section 5 of the Home Owners' Loan 
Act of 1933, as amended. As used in 
§§ 546.1, 546.2, 546.3, and 546.4 of Fart 
546, and in Parts 547, 548, 549, and 550 of 
this subchapter, the term "Federal as-
sociation" also includes any incorporated 
or unincorporated building, building or 
loan, building and loan, savings and 
loan, or homestead association, which 
has been organized or incorporated 
under or pursuant to the laws of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 
(33 FJEt. 10523, July 24, 1968] 
§ 541.3 Capital. 
The term "capital"- means the aggre-
gate of the payments on savings ac-
counts in a Federal association, plus 
earnings credited thereto, less lawful de-
ductions therefrom. 
[23 FJEt. 9890, Dec. 23, 1958] 
§ 5 4 1 . 4 Savings account* 
The term "savings account" means the 
monetary interest of the holder thereof 
in the capital of a Federal association 
and consists of the withdrawal value of 
such interest. 
[23 F.R. 9890, Dec. 23, 1958] 
§ 541*5 Short-term savings account-
The term "short-fcerat savings account" 
means a savings account in a Federal 
association which is to be withdrawn 
in less than twenty-four months from 
the date on which such account is 
opened, or a savings account In a Federal 
association established for the purpose 
of accumulating funds to pay taxes or 
Insurance premiums, or both, in connec-
tion with a loan on the security of a lien 
on real estate. 
[23 FJEt. 9890, Dee. 23, 1958] 
§ 5 4 1 . 6 Withdrawal value. 
The term "withdrawal value" means 
the amount paid on a savings account in 
a Federal association, plus earnings 
credited thereto, less lawful deductions 
therefrom. 
[23 FJL 9890, Dec. 23, 1958] 
§ 5 4 1 . 7 General reserves. 
The term "general reserves" means the 
aggregate amount of reserves of a Fed-
eral association established by such as-
sociation for the sole purpose of meeting 
losses. 
[23 FJ&. 9890, Dec. 23, 1958] 
§ 541.8 Surplus. 
The term "surplus" means the undis-
tributed earnings of a Federal associa-
tion which are held as unallocated re-
serves for general corporate use. 
[23 FJl. 9890, Dec. 23, 1958] 
§ 5 4 1 . 8 - 1 Net worth. 
The term "net worth" means the sum 
of all general reserves, surplus, and any 
other accounts of a Federal association 
which may be designated as part of net 
worth pursuant to the provisions of this 
subchapter. 
[37FJR. 12931, June 30,1972] 
§ 5 4 1 . 9 Loans o n the security o f first 
l iens . 
(a) The term "loans on the security 
of first liens" means loans on the secu-
rity of any instrument (whether a mort-
gage, deed of trust, or land contract) 
which makes the interest in the real es-
tate described therein (whether in fee 
or In a leasehold or subleasehold ex-
tending or renewable automatically or 
at the option of the holder (or at the 
option of the Federal association) for 
a period of at least 10 years beyond the 
maturity of the loan) specific security 
for the payment of the obligation se-
cured by such instrument: Provided, The 
instrument is of such nature that, in the 
event of default, the real estate described 
in such instrument could be subjected 
to the satisfaction of such obligation 
with the same priority as a first mort-
gage or a first deed of trust in the juris-
diction where the real estate Is located. 
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approval of its members as provided In 
this section. 
§ 543.11 Formal application* 
(a) Farm. Upon approval by its mem-
bers of the plan of conversion, as pro-
vided in § 543.10, the applicant may file 
its formal application for conversion 
into a Federal association in form pre-
scribed by the Board. (The Board has 
prescribed a form of "Application for 
Conversion into a Federal Association", 
copies of which may be obtained from 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
Washington, D.C., or from any Federal 
home loan bank.) 
(b) Filing. The formal application 
for conversion into a Federal association 
shall be filed in duplicate with the Board 
through the Federal home loan bank of 
which the applicant is or proposes to 
become a member; such application shall 
be accompanied by evidence satisfactory 
to the Board showing compliance by the 
applicant with all conditions prescribed 
by the Board in its approval of the pre-
liminaiy application for conversion Into 
a Federal association and, unless the 
applicant is insured by the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation, by 
formal application for insurance of 
accounts. 
(c) Issuance of charter. No formal 
application for conversion into a Federal 
association will be approved by the Board 
unless the applicant shall have been ap-
proved for membership in a Federal 
home loan bank. Upon approval by the 
Board of a formal application for con-
version into a Federal association, the 
Board will issue a Charter, as provided 
in § 544.1 of this subchapter; conversion 
into a Federal association is completed 
upon the issuance of such charter and 
upon compliance with all relevant re-
quirements of law, if any, which ex-
pressly provide for such conversion. 
§ 543*12 Organization after conversion. 
Upon Issuance of a Federal charter, as 
provided in § 543.11, a legal meeting of 
the members of such Federal association 
shall be held promptly, after due notice 
unless held upon a valid adjournment of 
a previous legal meeting. At such meet-
ing directors shall be elected and such 
other action shall be taken as is neces-
sary fully to carry into effect the con-
version as approved by the Board and 
to operate such Federal association In 
accordance with the law and the rules 
and regulations in this subchapter. Im-
mediately thereafter the board of direc-
tors shall meet, elect officers, and trans-
act such other business as may be neces-
sary and proper. 
[27F.R. 5S91, June 7.1982] 
PART 544—CHARTER AND BYLAWS 
CHASIXB 
Sec. 
544.1 Issuance of charter. 
* 544.2 Pending applications. 
544.3 Adoption of Charter N or Charter K 
(rev.). 
544.4 Evidence of corporate existence. 
BYLAWS 
644.5 Prescribed form. 
544.6 Amendment to bylaws. 
544.6-1 Preparedness emergency amend-
ments to bylaws. 
AVAZLABILXTY 
544.7 In offices of association. 
544.8 Amendment of Charter. 
AUTHORITY: The provisions of this Part 544 
Issued under sec. 5, 48 Stat. 182, as amended; 
12 TJ.S.C. 1464, Reorg. Plan No. 8 of 1947; 8 
CFR, 1943-1948 Comp. 
SOURCE: The provisions of this Part 544 
appear at 23 FJEL 9893, Dec. 28, 1958, unless 
otherwise noted. 
CHARTER 
§ 544.1 Issuance of charter* 
(a) Charter N. Except as provided 
In paragraph (b) of this section and in 
§ 544.2, the following form of charter, 
which shall be known as Charter N, will 
be Issued on and after the effective date 
of the rules and regulations in this sub-
chapter, upon approval by the Board of 
any petition for a charter for a Federal 
association pursuant to the provisions of 
subsections (a) or (1) of section 5 of 
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as 
amended: 
CHARTER N 
1. Corporate title. The full corporate title 
of the Federal association hereby chartered 
Is Federal 
Savings and Loan Association . 
2. Office. The home office shall he located 
at , in the County of 
, State of 
3. Object* and powers. The objects of the 
association are to promote thrift by providing 
a convenient and safe method for people to 
save and Invest money and to provide for the 
sound and economical financing of homes; 
and, In the accomplishment of such objects, 
It shall have perpetual succession and power: 
(1) To act as fiscal agent of the United States 
when designated for that purpose by the 
Secretary of the Treasury, under such regula-
tions as he may prescribe, and shall perform 
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all such reasonable duties as fiscal agent of 
the United States as he may require and to 
act as agent for any other Instrumentality of 
the United States when designated for that 
purpose by any such instrumentality; (2) To 
Bue and be sued, complain and defend In any 
court of law or equity; (8) To have a cor-
porate seal, affixed by Imprint* facsimile or 
otherwise; (4) To appoint afflcers and agents 
as Its business shall require, and allow them 
suitable compensation; (5) To adopt bylaws 
not Inconsistent with the Constitution or 
laws of the United States and rules and regu-
lations adopted thereunder and this charter; 
(6) To raise Its capital, which shall be un-
limited, by accepting payments on savings 
acounts representing share Interests in the 
association; (7) To borrow money; (8) To 
lend and otherwise invest Its funds; (9) To 
wind up and dissolve, merge, consolidate, 
convert, or reorganize; (10) To purchase 
hold, and convey real and personal estate 
consistent with Its objects, purposes, and 
powers; (11) To mortgage or lease any real 
and personal estate and take such property 
by gift, devise, or bequest; and (12) To exer-
cise all powers conferred by law. In addition 
to the foregoing powers expressly enumerated* 
this association shall have power to do all 
things reasonably Incident to the accomplish-
ment of Its express objects and the perform-
ance of Its express powers. It shall exercise 
Its powers In conformity with all laws of the 
United States as they now are, or as they may 
hereafer be amended, and with all rules and 
regulations which are not In conflict with this 
charter, now or hereafter made thereunder. 
4. Members. All holders of the associa-
tion's savings accounts and all borrowers 
therefrom are members. In the considera-
tion of all questions requiring action by the 
members of the association, each holder of 
a savings account shall be permitted to cast 
one vote for each $100, or fraction thereof, 
of the withdrawal value of his account. A 
borrowing member shall be permitted, as a 
borrower, to cast one vote, and to cast the 
number of votes to which he may be entitled 
as the holder of a savings account. No mem-
ber, however, shall cast more than 50 votes. 
Voting may be by proxy. Any number of 
members present at a regular or special 
meeting of the members shall constitute a 
quorum. A majority of all votes cast at 
any meeting of members shall determine 
any question. The members who shall be 
entitled to vote at any meeting of the mem-
bers Bhall be those owning savings accounts 
and borrowing members of record on the 
books of the association at the end of the 
calendar month next preceding the date of 
such meeting. The number of votes which 
each member shall be entitled to cast at 
any meeting of the members shall be deter-
mined from the books of the association as 
of the end of the calendar month next pre-
ceding the date of such meeting. Those who 
were members at the end of the calendar 
month next preceding the date of a meeting 
of members but who shall have ceased to 
be members prior to such meeting shall not 
be entitled to vote thereat. All savlngp 
accounts shall be nonassessable. 
5. Directors. The association shall be under 
the direction of a board of directors of 
not less than 5 nor more than 15, as fixed 
In the association's bylaws or, In the absence 
of any such bylaw provision, as from time to 
time expressly determined by resolution of 
the association's members. Each director of 
the association shall be a member of the as-
sociation, and a director shall cease to be a 
director when he ceases to be a member. 
Directors of the association shall be elected 
by its members by ballot; Provided, That in 
•the event of a vacancy in the directorate, In-
cluding vacancies created by an Increase in 
the number of directors, the board of direc-
tors may fill such vacancy. If the members 
of the association fall so to do, by electing a 
director to serve until the next annual meet-
ing of the members. Directors shall be 
elected for periods of 3 years and until their 
successors are elected and qualified, but pro-
vision shall be made for the election of ap-
proximately one-third of the board of direc-
tors each year. 
6. "Withdrawals. The association shall 
have the right to pay the withdrawal value 
of Its savings accounts at any time upon 
application therefor and to pay the holders 
thereof the withdrawal value thereof. Upon 
receipt of a written request from any holder 
of a savings account of the association for 
the withdrawal from such account of all .or 
any part of the withdrawal value thereof, 
the association shall within 30 days pay the 
amount requested; Provided, That if the as-
sociation is unable to pay all withdrawals 
requested at the end of 30 days from the 
date of such requests, it shall then pay all 
withdrawals requested In accordance with 
such methods and procedures as to amounts 
and allotments of funds for such purposes 
as shall be provided' In regulations made by 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board In effect 
at the date of the request for withdrawal. 
Holders of savings accounts for which appli-* 
cation for withdrawal has been made shall 
remain holders of savings accounts until paid 
and shall not become creditors. 
7. Redemption. At any time sufficient 
funds are on hand, the association shall have, 
the right to redeem, by lot or otherwise as 
the board of directors may determine, all or 
any part of any of its savings accounts on 
June 30 or December 31, by giving 30 days' 
notice of such redemption by registered mall 
addressed to the holder of each such savings 
account at his last address as recorded on the 
books of the association. The association 
may not redeem any of its savings accounts 
when there Is an impairment of Its capital 
or when It has any request for withdrawal 
which has been on file and unpaid for more 
than 30 days. The redemption price of each 
savings account redeemed shall be the full 
value thereof, as determined by the board of 
directors, but In no event shall the redemp-
tion price be less than the withdrawal 
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amount of such savings account. If a sav-
ings account which Is redeemed Is entitled 
to participate In any reserve for bonus, the 
amount In such reserve for bonus which Is 
properly allocable to such savlngB account 
shall be paid as part of the redemption price 
thereof. If any notice of redemption shall 
have been duly given, and If the funds neces-
sary for such redemption shall have been 
set aside so as to be and to continue to be 
available for that purpose, earnings upon 
such account shall cease to accrue from and 
after the date specified as the redemption 
date and all rights with respect to each such 
account shall forthwith, after such redemp-
tion date, terminate, except only the right 
of the holder of record of such savings 
account to receive the redemption price 
there of without earnings, 
8. Loans and investments. The associa-
tion may make any loan or Investment au-
thorized by statute and the rules and regu-
lations made by the Home Loan Bank Board 
and in effect on August 15,1949; it may make 
such additional loans and investments as 
may thereafter be authorized by amendments 
of the said rules and regulations. 
9. Power to borrow. The association may 
borrow money In an aggregate amount not 
exceeding one-half of Its capital; the amount 
which may be borrowed from sources other 
than a Federal home loan bank shall not 
exceed one-tenth of such capital. Notwith-
sanding the foregoing limitations, the asso-
ciation may, with prior approval by the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, borrow from a 
Federal home loan bank or from any Federal 
agency or instrumentality without limita-
tion, upon such terms and conditions as may 
be required by such bank or agency. The 
association may pledge and otherwise en-
cumber any of Its assets to secure its debts. 
10. Reserves, surplus, and distribution of 
earnings. The association shall maintain 
general reserves for the sole purpose of meet-
ing losses; such reserves shall Include the 
reserve required for insurance of accounts. 
Any losses may be charged against general 
reserves. If and whenever the general re-
serves of the association are not equal to at 
least 10 percent of Its capital. It shall, as of 
June SO and December 31 of each year, credit 
to such reserves an amount equivalent to at 
least 5 percent of Its net earnings for the 6 
months' period, or such amount as may be 
required by the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation, whichever is greater, 
until such reserves are equal to, at least 10 
percent of the association's capital. As of 
June SO and December 31 of each year, after 
payment or provision for payment of all ex-
penses, credits to general reserves and such 
credits to surplus as the board of directors 
may determine, and provision for bonus on 
savings accounts as authorized by regulations 
made by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
the board of directors of the association shall 
cause the remainder of the net earnings of 
the association for the 6 months' period to be 
distributed promptly on its savings accounts, 
ratably, as declared by the board of directors, 
to the withdrawal value thereof; in lieu of or 
in addition to such net earnings, any of the 
association's surplus funds may be likewise 
distributed. Such net earnings shall be cred-
ited to savlngB accounts or paid, as directed 
by the owner. All holders of savings accounts 
shall participate at the same rate and on the 
same basis in the distribution of earnings: 
Provided, That the association is not required 
to distribute earnings on short-term savings 
accounts or on a c c o u n t s of $10 or less. 
Except as provided, above, earnings shall be 
declared on all savings accounts of record at 
the close of each such 6 months' period, on 
the withdrawal value of each such account 
at the beginning of the said 6 months' period, 
plus the payments made thereon during such 
period (less amounts withdrawn, and, for 
purposes of participation In earnings, de-
ducted from the latest previous payments), 
computed at the declared rate for the time 
invested, determined as provided below. The 
date of Investment shall be the date of actual 
receipt of such payments by the association, 
unless the board of directors fixes a date, not 
later than the tenth of the month, for deter-
mining the date of investment of payments 
on savings accounts or designated classes 
thereof. Payments, affected by such deter-
mination date, received by /the association 
on or before such determination date shall 
receive earnings as if invested on the first of 
such month. Payments, affected by such de-
termination date, received subsequent to 
such determination date shall receive earn-
ings as if Invested on the first of the next 
succeeding month. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of its charter, the association 
may distribute net earnings on its savings 
accounts on such other basis and in accord-
ance with such other terms and conditions 
as may from time to time be authorized by 
regulations made by the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board. All holders of savings accounts 
of the association shall be entitled to equal 
distribution of assets, pro rata to the value of 
their savings accounts, in the event of volun-
tary or Involuntary liquidation, dissolution, 
or winding up of the association. 
11. Amendment of charter. No amendment, 
addition, alteration, change, or repeal of thlB 
charter shall be made unless such proposal 
Is made by the board of directors of the as-
sociation, and submitted to and approved by 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and is 
thereafter submitted to and approved by the 
members at a legal meeting. Any amend-
ment, addition, alteration, change, or repeal 
so acted upon and approved shall be effective, 
if filed with and approved by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, as of the date of the 
final approval of, or as fixed by, the members. 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, 
By 
(Chairman) 
Attest: 
(Secretary) 
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(b) Charter K (rev.). If expressly 
requested In the Petition for Charter, or 
In the Application for Conversion into 
a Federal association, the Board, In lieu 
of Charter Nt will issue a Charter K (rev.) , reading: as follows: 
CHAETEE K (REV.) 
1. Corporate title. The fuU corporate title 
of the Federal association hereby chartered 
is Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation 
2. Office. The home office shall be located 
at , in the County of , 
State of 
3. Objects and powers. The objects of the 
association are to promote thrift by provid-
ing a convenient and safe method for people 
to save and invest money and to provide for 
the sound and economical financing of 
homes; and, In the accomplishment of such 
objects, It shall have perpetual succession 
and power: (1) To act as fiscal agent of the 
United States when designated for that pur-
pose by the Secretary of the Treasury, under 
such regulations as he may prescribe, and 
shall perform all such reasonable duties as 
fiscal agent of the United States as he may 
require and to act as agent for any other 
instrumentality of the United States when 
designated for that purpose by any such 
instrumentality; (2) To sue and be sued, 
complain and defend In any court of law or 
equity; (3) To have a corporate seal, affixed 
by Imprint, facsimile or otherwise; (4) To 
appoint officers and agents as its business 
shall require, and allow them suitable com-
pensation; (5) To adopt bylaws not Incon-
sistent with the Constitution or laws of the 
United States and rules and regulations 
adopted thereunder and this charter; (6) To 
raise its capital, which shall be unlimited, 
by accepting payments on savings accounts 
representing share Interests In the associa-
tion; (7) To borrow money; (8) To lend and; 
otherwise Invest Its funds; (9) To wind up-
end dissolve, merge, consolidate, convert, 
or reorganize; (10) To purchase, hold, and 
convey real and personal estate consistent 
with its objects, purposes, and powers; (11) 
To mortgage or lease any real and personal 
estate and take such property by gift, devise, 
or bequest; and (12) To exercise all powers 
conferred by law. In addition to the fore-
going powers expressly enumerated, this 
association shall have power to do all things 
reasonably Incident to the accomplishment 
of its express objects and the performance 
of its express powers. It shall exercise its 
powers in conformity with all laws of the 
United States as they now axe, or as they may 
hereafter be amended, and with all rules and 
regulations which are not in conflict with 
this charter now or hereafter made there-
under. 
4. Members. All holders of the associa-
tion's savings accounts and all borowers 
therefrom are members. In the consider-
ation of all questions requiring action by the 
members of the association, each holder of 
a savings account shall be permitted to cast 
one vote for each $100, or fraction thereof, 
of the withdrawal value of his account. A 
borrowing member shall be permitted, as a 
borrower, to cast one vote, and to cast the 
number of votes to which he may be entitled 
as the holder of a savings account. No 
member, however, shall cast more than 50 
votes. Voting may be by proxy. Any num-
ber of members present at a regular or 
special meeting of the members shall consti-
tute a quorum. A majority of all votes cast 
at any meeting of members shall determine 
any question. The members who shall be 
entitled to vote at any meeting of the mem-
bers shall be those owning savings accounts 
and borrowing members of record on the 
books of the association at the end of the 
calendar month next preceding the date of 
such meeting. The number of votes which 
each member shall be entitled to cast at any 
meeting of the members shall be determined 
from the books of the association as of the 
end of the calendar' month next preceding 
the date of such meeting. Those who were 
members at the end of the calendar month 
next preceding the date of a meeting of mem-
bers but who shall have ceased to be mem-
bers, prior to such meeting shall not be 
entitled to vote thereat. All savings accounts 
shall be nonassessable. 
5. Directors. The association shall be 
under the direction of a board of directors 
of not less than 5 nor more than 15, as fixed 
in the association's bylaws or, In the absence 
of any such bylaw provision, as from time 
to time expressly determined by resolution 
of the association's members. Each director 
of the association 6ha!l be a member of the 
association, and a director shall cease to be 
a director when he ceases to be a member. 
Directors of the association shall be elected 
by its members by ballot: Provided, That in 
the event of a vacancy In the directorate, 
including vacancies created by an Increase 
in the number of directors, the board of 
directors may fill such vacancy, if the mem-
bers of the association fail so to do, by 
electing a director to serve until the next 
ariTiual meeting of the members. Directors 
shall be elected for periods of 3 years and 
until their successors are elected and quali-
fied, but provision shall be made for the 
election of approximately one-third of the 
board of directors each year. 
6. Withdrawals. The association shall have 
the right to pay the withdrawal value of its 
savings accounts at any time upon applica-
tion therefor and to pay the holders thereof 
the withdrawal value thereof. Upon receipt 
of a written request from any holder of a 
savings account of the association for the 
withdrawal from such account of all or any 
part of the withdrawal value thereof, the 
association shall within 30 days pay the 
amount requested; Provided, That If the as-
sociation Is unable to pay all withdrawals 
requested at the end of 30 days from the 
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date of such requests, It shall then proceed 
in the following manner while any with* 
drawal request remains unpaid for more thai1 
$a d&3&\ 
Withdrawal requests shall be paid in th e 
order received and if any holder of a saving8 
account or accounts has requested the with* 
drawal of more than $1,000, he shall be paid 
$1,000 in order when reached and his with" 
drawal request shall be charged with sucP 
amount as paid and shall be renumbered 
and placed at the end of the list of with" 
drawal requests, and thereafter, upon agaiA 
being reached, shall be paid a like amount'. 
but not exceeding the withdrawal value o* 
his savings account, and until such wlth~ 
drawal request shall have been paid in full* 
shall continue to be so paid, renumbered, and 
replaced at the end of the withdrawal re' 
quests on file: Provided, That when any suc£ 
request Is reached for payment, the associs' 
tion shall so advise the holder of such s a v 
ings account by registered mall to his last 
address as recorded on the books of th£ 
association and, unless such holder shall 
apply in person or in writing for the payment 
of such withdrawal request within 80 day? 
from the date of the mailing of such notice* 
no payment on account of such withdrawal 
request shall be made and such request shall 
board of directors shall have absolute right 
to pay on an equitable basis an amount not 
exceeding $200 to any holder of a saving* 
account or accounts in any calendar montH 
and without regard to any other provision 
of this section. 
When the association is unable to pay all 
withdrawal requests within a period not ex" 
ceedlng SO days from the date of receipt of 
written request therefor it shall allot to th0 
payment of such requests the remainder of 
the association's receipts from all source* 
after deducting from total receipts appro-
priate amounts for expenses, required pay 
ments on indebtedness, earnings distributa' 
ble in cash to holders of savings account** 
and a fund for general corporate purpose* 
equivalent to not more than 20 percent of 
the association's receipts from holders of it* 
savings accounts and from its borrowers* 
Holders of savings accounts for which appll' 
cation for withdrawal has been made shall 
remain holders of savings accounts until 
paid and shall not become creditors. 
7. Redemption. At any time sufficient 
funds are on hand, the association shall 
as the board of directors may determine, all 
or any part of any of Its savings accounts on 
June 30 or December 31, by giving 30 days' 
notice of such redemption by registered mail 
addressed to the holder of each such saving* 
account at his last address as recorded on 
the books of the association. The associa-
tion may not redeem any of Its savings a c 
counts when there is an Impairment of it* 
capital or when it has any request for with-
drawal which has been on file and unpaid lof 
more than 30 days. The redemption pric* 
of each savings account redeemed shall be 
the full value thereof, as determined by the 
board of directors, but in no event shall the 
redemption nrlce be less than the withdrawal 
amount of such savings account. If a sav-
ings account which is redeemed is entitled to 
participate in any reserve for bonus, the 
amount in such reserve for bonus which Is 
properly allocable to such savings account 
shall be paid as part of the redemption price 
thereof. If any notice of redemption shall 
have been duly given, and If the funds neces-
sary for such redemption shall have been set 
aside so as to be and to continue to be 
available for that purpose, earnings upon 
such account shall cease to accrue from and 
after the date specified as the redemption 
date and all rights with respect to each such 
account shall forthwith, after such redemp-
tion date, terminate, except only the right of 
the holder of record of such savings account 
to receive the redemption price thereof with-
out earnings. 
8. Loans and investments. The associa-
tion may make any loan or Investment au-
thorized by statute and the rules and 
regulations made by the Home Loan Bank 
Board and in effect on August 15, 1949; it 
may make such additional loans and in-
vestments as may thereafter be authorized by 
tions. 
9. Power to borrow. The association may 
borrow money in an aggregate amount not 
exceeding one-half of Its capital; the amount 
which may be borrowed from sources other 
than a Federal home loan bank shall net 
exceed one-tenth of such capital. Notwith-
standing the foregoing limitations, the asso-
ciation may, with prior approval by. the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, borrow from 
a Federal home loan bank or from any Fed-
eral agency or Instrumentality without limi-
tation, upon such terms and conditions as 
may be required by such bank or agency. 
The association may pledge and otherwise 
encumber any of its assets to secure its 
debts. 
10. Reserves, surplus, and distribution of 
earnings. The association shall maintain 
general reserves for the sole purpose of 
meeting losses; such reserves shall include 
the reserve required for insurance of ac-
counts. Any losses may be charged against 
general reserves. If and whenever the gen-
eral reserves of the association are not equal 
to at least 10 percent of Its capital, it shall, 
year, credit to such reserves an amount 
equivalent to at least 6 percent of its net 
earnings for the 6 months' period, or such 
amount as may be required by the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 
whichever Is greater, until such reserves are 
equal to at least lb percent of the asso-
ciation's capital. As of June 30 and Decem-
ber 31 of each year, after payment or pro-
vision for. payment of all expenses, credits 
to general reserves and such credits to sur-
plus as the board of directors may deter-
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mine, and provision for bonus on savings 
accounts as authorized by regulations made 
by the Federal Home loan Bank Board, the 
board of directors of the association shall 
cause the remainder of the net earnings of 
the association for the 6 months' period to be 
distributed promptly on Its savings ac-
counts, ratably, as declared by the board 
of directors, to the withdrawal value thereof; 
In lieu of or in addition to such net earn-
ings, any of the association's surplus funds 
may be likewise distributed. Such net earn-
ings shall be credited to savings accounts 
or paid, as directed by the owner. All 
holders of savings accounts shall participate 
at the same rate and on the same basis 
in the distribution of earnings: Provided, 
That the association Is not required to dis-
tribute earnings on short-term savings ac-
counts or on accounts of $10 or less. Except 
as provided above, earnings shall be declared 
on all savings accounts of record at the 
close of each such 6 months' period, on 
the withdrawal value of each such account 
at the beginning of the said 6 months' 
period, plus the payments made thereon 
during such period (less amounts with-
drawn, and, for purposes of participation 
In earnings, deducted from the latest pre-
vious payments), computed at the declared 
rate for the time invested, determined as 
provided below. The date of investment 
shall be the date of actual receipt of such 
payments by the association, unless the 
board of directors fixes a date, not later 
than the tenth of the month, for deter-
mining the date of investment of payments 
on savings accounts or designated classes 
thereof. Payments, affected by such deter-
mination date, received by the association 
on or before such determination date, shall 
receive earnings as If Invested on the first 
of such month. Payments, affected by such 
determination date, received subsequent to 
such determination date, shall receive 
earnings as if Invested on the first of the 
next succeeding month. Notwithstanding 
any other provision of Its charter, the asso-
ciation may distribute net earnings on its 
savings accounts on such other basis and 
in accordance with such other terms and 
conditions as may from time to time be 
authorized by regulations made by the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board. All holders of 
savings accounts of the association shall be 
entitled to equal distribution of assets, pro 
rata to the value of their savings accounts, in 
the event of voluntary or Involuntary liqui-
dation, dissolution, or winding up of the 
association. 
11, Amendment of charter. No amend-
ment, addition, alteration, change, or repeal 
of this charter shall be made unless such 
proposal Is made by the board of directors 
of the association, and submitted to and 
approved by the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board, and is thereafter submitted to and 
approved by the members at a legal meeting. 
Any amendment, a d d i t i o n , alteration, 
change, or repeal so acted upon and approved 
Shall be effective, if filed with and approved 
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, as of 
the date of the final approval of, or as fixed 
by, the members. 
FRDTCBAT. HOME LOAN BANK. BOABD, 
By ™ . . . . 
(Chairman) 
Attest: 
(Secretary) 
§ 544.2 Pending applications. 
All pertinent provisions of Part 542 of 
this subchapter in effect prior to the ef-
fective date hereof shall remain in full 
force and effect as to any formal applica-
tions made prior to such date for per-
mission to organize a Federal association 
under the provisions of section 5(a), or 
to convert to a Federal association under 
the provisions of section 5(i), of the 
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as 
amended. 
§ 544,3 Adoption 
terK (rev.). 
A Federal association that has a Char-
ter E or a Charter K may mend such 
charter in its entirety to read in the form 
of Charter N or Charter K (rev.)
 t by ma-jority vote of such association's members 
present at any duly called regular or spe-
cial meeting of members and the mem-
bers of a Charter N Federal association 
may similarly amend such association's 
charter in its entirety to read in the form 
of Charter K (rev.): Provided, That, in 
the case of a Federal association that has 
a Charter K or Charter N, the board of 
directors of such association shall first 
have proposed such amendment, and the 
provisions of this section shall be deemed 
to be the approval by the Board of such 
proposal. Upon receipt of the following 
petition from a Federal association that 
has amended its charter as provided in 
this section, the Board will issue to such 
Federal association, as requested by it a 
Charter N or a Charter K (rev.) in the 
same name and showing the same loca-
tion of home office as is prescribed in 
such association's present charter, unless 
the Board when petitioned approves a 
change in such name or location: 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOABD, 
Washington, D.C. 
The undersigned, pursuant to 8 544.3 of 
the rules and regulations for the Federal 
Savings and Loan System, respectfully peti-
tions the Board to issue an amended charter 
in the form of Charter (Insert "N" or "K. 
(rev.)'% as voted by the members), to the 
undersigned, fixing the name and home office 
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of the undersigned which its present charter 
prescribes. 
The undersigned, by Its secretary, hereby 
certifies that the members at a meeting duly 
called and held adopted the following reso-
lution: 
Be it resolved, That the present charter of 
this association be amended to read in the 
form of Charter (insert "N" or "K (rev.)", 
as voted by the members) as set forth in 
§ 544.1 of the rules and regulations for the 
Federal Savings and Loan System, prescrib-
ing the present name and home office fixed 
by the present charter of this association. 
In witness whereof, the Secretary of the 
undersigned has hereunto affixed his hand 
and the seal of the undersigned this 
day of , 19 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION 
[CORPORATE SEAL J B y , 
§544*4 Evidence nl corporate exist-
ence* 
The issuance of a charter to a Federal 
association shall constitute the Incorpo-
ration of such Federal association by the 
Board; the charter of a Federal associa-
tion, or a certified copy thereof under 
the seal of the Board, shall be evidence 
of the corporate existence of such Fed-
eral association. 
BYLAWS 
§ 544*5 Prescribed form. 
A Federal association that has a 
Charter N or Charter K (rev.) shall op-
erate under the following prescribed by-
laws, unless and until such bylaws are 
amended in accordance with the pro-
cedure therein set forth: 
1. Annual meetings of members. The an-
nual meeting of the members of the asso-
ciation for the election of directors and for 
the transaction of any other business of the 
association shall he held at Its home office 
at 2 o'clock In .the afternoon on the third 
Wednesday In January of each-year, If not a 
legal holiday* or If a legal holiday then on 
the next succeeding day not a legal holiday. 
The annual meeting may be held at such 
other time on such day or at such other place 
in t&fe same community *s -tha \>oax& oi 
directors may determine. At each annual 
meeting, the officers shall make a full re-
port of the financial condition of the asso-
ciation and of Its progress for the preceding 
year, and shall outline a program for the suc-
ceeding year. Annual meetings of the mem-
bers shall be conducted in accordance with 
Roberts' Rules of Order. 
2. Special meetings of members. Special 
meetings of the members of the association 
may be called at any time by the president 
or the board of directors, and shall be caUed 
by the president, a vice president, or the 
secretary upon the written request of mem-
bers holding of record In the aggregate at 
least one-tenth of the capital of the associa-
tion. Such written request shall state the 
purposes of the meeting and shall be deliv-
ered at the home office of the association 
addressed to the president. Special meetings 
of the members shaU be conducted in accord-
ance with Roberts' Rules of Order. 
3. Notice of meeting of members, (a) Notice 
of each annual meeting shall be either pub-
lished once a wees: for the two successive 
calendar weeks {in each-instance on any day 
of the week) Immediately prior to the week 
in which such annual meeting shall con-
vene, In a newspaper printed In the English 
language and of general circulation in the 
city or county in which the home office of 
the association is located or mailed postage 
prepaid at least (insert number not less than 
15) days and not more than (Insert number 
not more than 45) days prior to the date on 
which such annual meeting shall convene to 
each of Its members of record at his last 
address appearing on the books of the asso-
ciation. Such notice shall state the name of 
the association, the place of the annual meet-
ing and the time when it shall convene. A 
similar notice shall be posted in a conspicu-
ous place in each of the offices of the asso-
ciation during the 14 days immediately 
preceding the date on which such annual 
meeting shall convene. If any member, in 
person or by attorney thereunto authorized, 
shall waive in writing notice of any annual 
meeting of members, notice thereof need not 
be given to such member. 
(b) Notice of each special meeting shall 
be either published once a week for the two 
consecutive calendar weeks (In each Instance 
on any day of the week) Immediately prior 
to the week in which such special meeting 
shall convene, in a newspaper printed In the 
English language and of general circulation 
in the city or county In which the home of-
fice of the association Is located, or mailed 
postage prepaid at least (insert number not 
less than 15) days and not more than (insert 
number not more than 45) days prior to the 
date on which such special meeting shaU 
convene to each of its members of record at 
his last address appearing on the books of 
the association. Such notice shall state the 
name of the association, the purpose or pur-
poses for which the meeting is called, the 
place of the special meeting and the time 
when i t shaft convene. A Binmar notice shall 
be posted in a conspicuous place in each of 
the offices of the association during the 14 
days immediately preceding the date on 
which such special meeting shall convene. If 
any member, in person or by attorney there-
unto authorized, shall waive in writing notice 
of any special meeting of members, notice 
thereof need not be given to such member. 
4. Meetings of the board of directors. The 
board of directors shall meet regularly with-
out notice at the home office of the assocla-
HeinOnline -- CFR 298 1975 
Chapter V—Federal Home Loan Bank Board §544.5 
tlon at least once each month at the hour 
and date fixed by resolution of the board 
of directors, provided that the place of meet-
ing may be changed by the directors. Special 
meetings of the board of directors may be 
held at any place in the territory in which 
the association may make loans specified in 
a notice of such meeting and shall be called 
by the secretary upon the written request 
of the president, or of three .directors. All 
special meetings shall be held upon at least 
8 days' written notice to each director unless 
notice be waived in writing before or after 
such meeting. Such notice shall state the 
place, time, and purposes of such meeting. 
A majority of the directors shall constitute 
a quorum for the transaction of business. 
The act of a majority of the directors present 
at any meeting at which there is a quorum 
Bhall be the act of the board of directors. 
All meetings of the board of directors shall 
be conducted in accordance with Koberts* 
Rules of Order. 
5. Officers, employees, and agents. An-
nually at the meeting of the board of direc-
tors of the association next following the 
annual meeting of the members of the asso-
ciation, the board of directors shall elect a 
president, one or more vice presidents, a sec-
retary, and a treasurer: Provided, That the 
offices of secretary and treasurer may be held 
by the same person, and a vice president may 
also be either the secretary or the treasurer. 
The board of directors may appoint such ad-
ditional officers and such employees and 
agents as it may from time to time determine. 
The term of office of all officers shall be one 
year or until their respective successors are 
elected and qualified; but any officer may be 
removed at any time by the board of di-
rectors. In the absence of designation from 
time to time of powers and duties by the 
board of directors, the officers shall have such 
powers and duties as generally pertain to 
their respective offices. 
6. Resignation of directors. Any di-
rector may resign at any time by sending a 
written notice of such resignation to the 
office of the association delivered to the sec-
retary. Unless otherwise specified therein, 
6uch resignation shall take effect upon re-
ceipt thereof by the secretary. More than 
three consecutive absences from regular 
meetings of the board of directors, unless ex-
cused by resolution of the board of directors, 
shall automatically constitute a resignation, 
effective when such resignation is accepted 
by the board of directors. 
7. Powers of the board. The board i>r iff 
rectors shall have power— 
(a) To appoint and remove by resolution 
the members of an executive committee, the 
members of which shall be directors, which 
committee shall have and exercise the powers 
of the board of directors between the meet-
ings of the board of directors; 
(b) To appoint and remove by resolution 
the members of such other committees as 
may be deemed necessary and prescribe the 
duties thereof; 
(c) To fix the compensation of directors, 
officers, and employees; and to remove any 
officer or employee at any time with or with-
out cause; 
(d) To extend leniency and Indulgence to 
borrowing members who axe in distress and 
generally to compromise and settle any debts 
and claims; 
(e) To limit payments on capital which 
may be accepted; 
(t) To reject any application for savings 
accounts or membership; and 
(g) To exercise any and all of the powers 
of the association not expressly reserved by 
the charter to the members. 
8. Execution of instruments, generally. 
All documents and instruments or writings 
of any nature shall be signed, executed, veri-
fied, acknowledged, and delivered by such 
officers, agents, or employees of the associa-
tion or any one of them and in such manner 
as from time to time may be determined by 
resolution of the board of directors. All 
notes, drafts, acceptances, checks, endorse-
ments, and all evidences of indebtedness of 
the association whatsoever shall be signed 
by such officer or officers or such agent or 
agents of the association" and in such man-
ner as the board of directors may from time 
to time determine. Endorsements for de-
posit to the credit of the association In any 
of its duly authorized depositaries shall be 
made In such manner as the board of di-
rectors may from time to time determine. 
Proxies to vote with respect to shares or ac-
counts of other associations or stock of other 
corporations owned by or standing in the 
name of the association may be executed 
and delivered from time to time on behalf 
of the association by the president or a vice 
president and the secretary or an assistant 
secretary of the association or by any other 
person or persons thereunto authorized by 
the board of directors. 
9. Savings account certificates. Such of-
ficers or employees as may be designated by 
the board of directors shall deliver to each 
person upon the initial payment on his sav-
ings account in the association an account 
boofc or other written
 x evidence of such 
account. 
10. Seah The seal shall be two concentric 
circles between which shall be the name of 
the association. The year of incorporation, 
the word Mincorporatedw, or an emblem may 
appear in the center. 
11. Amendment. These bylaws may be 
amended at any time by a two-thirds affirma-
tive vote of the board of directors, or by a 
vote of the members of the association. 
Each and every amendment shall be sub-ject to the approval of the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board, and shall be Ineffective 
untU such approval shall be given: Provided, 
That, without the approval of the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, section l of the 
bylaws may be amended .so that the time of 
day ror convening the annual meeting may 
be fixed at any hour not earlier than 10 *"v 
or later than 9 pjn., and a section providing 
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for a bonus niay be added or repealed as 
provided in the rules and regulations for the 
Federal Savings and Loan System. 
[23 FTt 9893, Dec. 23, 1958, as amended at 
38 PR 33456, Dec. 5,1973] 
§ 544.6 Amendment to bylaws. 
This section constitutes approval by 
the Board of any one or more of the fol-
lowing amendments to the bylaws of any 
Federal association, or of an amend-
ment repealing any provision of such 
association's bylaws providing for a 
bonus other than a bonus under the 
provisions of § 545.3 of this chapter, upon 
the valid adoption of any such amend-
ment by such association's directors or 
members as provided in its bylaws, effec-
tive when so adopted: Provided, That the 
approval given by this section to the by-
law amendment set forth in paragraph (e) of this section shall be applicable 
only to a Federal association which has 
a charter in a form which is not incon-
sistent with the provisions of § 545.3 of 
this chapter and which, at the time such 
bylaw amendment becomes effective, does 
not have in its bylaws any other provi-
sion providing for the payment of a 
bonus on savings accounts of such 
association: (a) Nominating committee. The pres-
ident, at least 30 days prior to the date 
of each annual meeting, shall appoint 
a nominating committee of three persons 
who are members of the association. 
Such committee shall make nominations 
for directors in writing, and deliver to 
the secretary such written nominations 
at least 15 days prior to the date of the 
annual meeting, which nominations shall 
forthwith be posted in a prominent place 
in the home office for the 15 days* pe-
riod prior to the date of the annual 
meeting. Provided such committee Is 
appointed and makes such nominations, 
no nominations for directors except those-
made by the nominating committee shall 
be voted upon at the annual meeting un-
less other nominations by members are 
made in writing and delivered to the 
secretary of the association at least 10 
days prior to the date of the annual 
meeting, which nomination shall forth-
with be posted in a prominent place 
in the home office for the 10 days' period 
prior to the date of the annual meet-
ing. Ballots bearing the names of all 
persons nominated by the nominating 
committee and by other members prior 
to the annual meeting shall be provided 
for use by the members at the annual 
meeting. If at any time the president 
shall fail to appoint such nominating 
committee, or the nominating committee 
shall fail or refuse to act at least 15 days 
prior to the annual meeting, nomina-
tions for directors may be made at the 
anual meeting by any member and shall 
be voted upon* 
(b) New business. Any new business 
to be taken up at the annual meeting, 
including any proposal to increase or 
decrease the number of directors of the 
association, shall be stated in writing 
and filed with the secretary of the as-
sociation on or before 30 days before the 
date of the annual meeting, and all busi-
ness so stated, proposed and filed shall be 
considered at the annual meeting, but no 
other proposal shall be acted upon at the 
annual meeting. Any member may 
make any other proposal at the annual 
meeting and the same may be discussed 
and considered* but unless stated in 
writing and filed with the secretary 30 
days before the meeting such proposal 
shall be laid over for action at an ad-journed, special or regular meeting of 
the members taking place 30 days or 
more thereafter. This provision shall 
not prevent the consideration and ap-
proval or disapproval at the annual 
meeting of the reports of officers and 
committees, but in connection with such 
reports no new business shall be acted 
upon at such annual meeting unless 
stated and filed as herein provided. 
(c) Voting by proxy. Voting at any 
annual or special meeting of the mem-
bers may be made by proxy, it being 
provided that no proxies shall be voted 
at any meeting unless such proxies shall 
have been placed on file with the secre-
tary of the association, for verification, 
at least 5 days prior to the date on which 
such meeting shall convene. (d) Number of directors. The num-
ber of directors of the association shall 
be „ _ „ __ . 
(e) Bonus on savings accounts. The 
board of directors shall have exclusive 
power to obligate the association to dis-
tribute a bonus on savings accounts, and 
to terminate such obligation, in accord-
ance with rules and regulations made by 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
(f) Bonus accounts. The association 
shall be obligated to pay a bonus for 
regular payments on savings accounts 
upon the bonus plan set forth in the 
rules and regulations made by the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board. 
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lbi Communications with Members. 
Every member of the association shall 
have the right to inspect the records of 
the association which pertain solely to 
his own accounts. Every member shall 
have the right to communicate with other 
members in relation to any matter which 
may properly be considered at a meet-
ing of members* The association may 
not defeat such right by a redemption 
of the member's savings account in the 
association. Any member requesting a 
communication with other members as 
provided herein shall, not less than 30 
days prior to the date of an annual meet-
ing and not less than 10 days prior to 
the date of a special meeting, furnish 
the association with the following infor-
mation, in writing and subscribed by 
him: CI) His full name and address; (2) 
the nature and extent of his interest in 
the association at the time his applica-
tion is made; (3) a statement of the rea-
sons for and purposes of the communica-
tion which he desires to make with other 
members; (4) a copy of such communi-
cation; and (5) the date of the annual 
or special meeting of the members of 
the association at which the matter will 
be presented for consideration. Upon 
receipt of such request, unless made for 
an improper purpose, the association 
shall, within 10 days of receipt in the 
case of an annual meeting and within 
3 days of receipt in the case of a special 
meeting, notify the member either (i) of 
the number of the association's members 
and of the estimated amount of the as-
sociation's reasonable costs and expenses 
of mailing the communication to ltd 
members, or (ii) of its determination not 
to honor the request because the lattei 
fails to comply with the provisions on 
this section. After receipt of sucb 
amount and sufficient copies of the mem* 
ber's communication, the association 
shall mail the same to all its memoers 
by a class of mail specified by the re-
questing member within 7 days of re-
ceipt of such amount and copies In the 
case of an annual meeting and at the 
earliest practicable date prior to the 
meeting in the case of a special meeting 
(or, in either case, such later date as 
the requesting member may specify). 
(h) Age limitation on directors. No 
person shall be eligible for election, re-
election, appointment, or reappointment 
to the board of directors of the asso-
ciation if such person is then more 
than (flu in any age from 65 to 70) years 
of age» No director shall serve beyond 
the annual meeting of the association 
immediately following his attainment of 
(fill In the same age from 65 to 70 as 
used above) years of age; except that any 
such director serving on (fill in date of 
adoption of bylaw) may complete the 
unexpired portion of his term being 
served on such date. This age limitation 
shall not apply to a person serving a& an 
advisory director of the association. 
(i) Age limitation on officers. No per-
son shall be eligible for election, reelec-
tion, appointment, or reappointment as 
an officer of the association if such per-
son is then more than (fill in any age 
from 65 to 70) years of age. No officer 
shall serve beyond the annual meeting 
of the association immediately follow-
ing his attainment of (fill in the same age 
from 65 to 70 as used above) years of 
age; except that any such officer serving 
on (fill in date of adoption of bylaw) may 
complete the unexpired portion of his 
term being served on such date. 
(j) Annual meeting of members. Sub-
stitute the following for section 1 of the 
bylaws prescribed in § 544.5: 
(1) Annual meetings of members. The 
annual meeting of the members of the 
association for the election of directors 
and for the transaction of any other 
business of the association shall be held 
at its home office at 2 o'clock in the 
afternoon on (insert a date not 
earlier than 15 days after the annual 
closing of the association's books and 
not later than 3 months and 15 days 
after such closing of the association's 
books) of each year, if not a Sunday or 
legal holiday, or, if a Sunday or a legal 
holiday, then on the next succeeding day 
not a Sunday or a legal holiday. The an-
nual meeting may be held at such other 
time on such day or at such other place 
in the same community as the board of 
directors may determine. At each annual 
meeting, the officers shall make a full 
report of the financial condition of the 
association and of its progress for the 
preceding year, and shall outline a pro-
gram for the succeeding year. Annual 
meetings of the members shall be con-
ducted in accordance with Roberts' Rules 
of Order. In lieu of the date specified in 
the first sentence of this subparagraph, 
such annual meeting in any year may be 
held on another date which is not a 
Sunday or a legal holiday and which is 
not earlier than 15 days after the annual 
closing of the association's books and 
not later than 3 months and 15 days 
after such closing of the association's 
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met: (i) The board of directors determines 
the date by resolution adopted at least 
2 months before the annual closing of 
the books for the year preceding the 
year in which the annual meeting is to 
beheld; and 
(ii) Notice of said date is continuously 
posted in a conspicuous place in each of 
the offices of the association during the 
50 days immediately preceding the date 
so determined. 
(k) Officers, employees and agents. 
Substitute the following for section 5 of 
the bylaws prescribed in § 544.5: 
(6) Officers, employees and agents. An-
nually at the meeting of the board of direc-
tors of the association next foUowlng the 
annual meeting of the members of the as-
sociation, the board of directors shall elect a 
president, one or more vice presidents, a sec-
retary, and a treasurer. The offices of secre-
tary and treasurer may be held by the same 
person, and a vice president may also be 
either the secretary or the treasurer. The 
board of directors may appoint such addition-
al officers and such employees and agents 
as it may from time to time determine. The 
term of office of all officers shall be one year 
or until their respective successors are elected 
(or appointed) and qualified. However, the 
board of directors may authorize the associa-
tion to enter into an employment contract 
with any officer in accordance with regula-
tions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; 
but no such contract shall impair the right 
of the board of directors to remove any officer 
at any time. In the absence of designation 
from time .to time of powers and duties by the 
board of directors, officers shall have such 
powers and duties as generally pertain to 
their respective offices. 
[23 F.K. 9893, Dec. 28, 1958, as amended at 
26 FJR. 5173, June 9, 1961; SO FJR. 16106. 
Dec. 28, 1965; 36 FR, 24113, Dec. 21, 1971; 
38 FR 10253, Apr. 26, 1973; 38 FR 35436, 
Dec. 28, 1973; 39 FR 28610. Aug. 9, 1974, as 
amended at 39 FR 31301, Aug. 28, 1974; 39 
FR 42341, Dec. 5,1974] 
NOTE: The amendment at 39 FR 42341, 
Dec. 5, 1974, becomes effective January 6, 
1975. 
§ 544*6—1 Preparedness e m e r g e n c y 
amendments to bylaws. 
This section constitutes approval by 
the Board of any one or more of the fol-
lowing amendments to the bylaws of any 
Federal association, upon the valid 
adoption of any such amendment by 
such association's directors or members 
as provided in its bylaws, effective when 
so adopted: 
(a) Emergency operations by surviv-
ing staff. In the event "of an emergency 
declared by the President of the United 
States or the person performing his 
functions, the officers and employees of 
this association will continue to conduct 
the affairs of the association under such 
guidance from the directors as may be 
available except as to matters which by 
statute require specific approval of the 
board of directors and subject to con-
formance with any governmental direc-
tives during the emergency. (b) Emergency operations by directors 
or members of executive committee. 
The board of directors shall have the 
power, in the absence or disability of any 
officer, or upon the refusal of any officer 
to act, to delegate and prescribe such 
officer's powers and duties to any other 
officer, or to any director, for the time 
being. In the event of a state of disaster 
of sufficient severity to prevent the con-
duct and management of the affairs and 
business of this association by its direc-
tors and officers as contemplated by 
these bylaws, any two or more available 
members of the then incumbent execu-
tive committee 6hall constitute a quorum 
of that committee for the full conduct 
and management of the affairs and busi-
ness of the association in accordance 
with the provisions of Article of 
these bylaws. In the event of the un-
availability, at such time, of a minimum 
of two members of the then incumbent 
executive committee, any three available 
directors shall constitute the executive 
committee for the full conduct and man-
agement of the affairs and business of 
the association in accordance with the 
foregoing provisions of this section. 
This bylaw shall be subject to imple-
mentation by resolutions of the board of 
directors passed from time to time for 
that purpose, and any provisions of these 
bylaws (other than this section) and any 
resolutions which are contrary to the 
provisions of this section or to the pro-
visions of any such implementary resolu-
tions shall be suspended until it shall be 
determined by any interim executive 
committee acting under this section that 
it shall be to the advantage of this asso-
ciation to resume the conduct and man-
agement of its affairs and business under 
all of the other provisions of these by-
laws. (c) Officer succession. If consequent 
upon war or warlike damage or disaster, 
the president of this association cannot 
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be located by the then acting home office 
or is unable to assume or to continue 
normal executive duties, then the au-
thority and duties of the president shall, 
without further action of the board of 
directors, be automatically assumed by 
one of the following persons in the order 
designated: (List of names in order of 
succession is shown in the official min-
utes of the association and in the cer-
tified copies which are under seal in 
various depositories.) 
Any one of the above persons who in 
accordance with this resolution assumes 
the authority and duties of the president 
shall continue to serve until he resigns 
or until five-sixths of the other officers 
who are attached to the then acting 
home office decide in writing he is unable 
to perform said duties or until the elected 
president of this association, or a person 
higher on the above list, shall become 
available to perform the duties of presi-
dent of the association. If consequent 
upon war or warlike damage or disaster, 
the treasurer of this association cannot 
be located by the then acting home office 
or is unable to assume or to continue 
normal executive duties, then the au-
thority and duties of the treasurer shall, 
without further action by the board of 
directors, be automatically assumed by 
one of the following persons in the order 
designated: (List of names in order of 
succession is shown in the official min-
utes of the association and in the cer-
tified copies which are under seal In var-
ious depositories.) 
The person assuming the authority and 
duties of treasurer in accordance with 
this resolution shall serve until (1) the 
elected treasurer or person whose name 
is higher on the above list shall be able 
to function as treasurer, or (2) until he 
resigns or Is unable as determined by the 
acting president to perform the duties 
of his office. In the case of subparagraph 
(2) of this paragraph, the next eligible 
and available person on the above list 
shall assume the authority and duties 
of the treasurer. Anyone dealing with 
this association may accept a certifica-
tion by any three officers that a specified 
individual is acting as president or that 
a specified individual is acting as treas-
urer in accordance with this resolution; 
and that anyone accepting such certifi-
cation may continue to consider it in 
force until notified In writing of a 
change, said notice of change to carry 
the signatures of three officers of the as-
sociation. (d) Providing for alternate locations. 
The offices of the association at which its 
business shall be conducted shall be the 
home office thereof located at 
Street, , (and 
branches, If any), and any other legally 
authorized location which may be leased 
or acquired by this association to carry 
on its business. During an emergency 
resulting in any authorized place of busi-
ness of this association being unable to 
function, the business ordinarily con-
ducted at such location shall be relocated 
elsewhere in suitable quarters, in addi-
tion to or in lieu of the locations here-
tofore mentioned, as may be designated 
by the board of directors or by the execu-
tive committee or by such persons as are 
then, in accordance with resolutions 
adopted from time to time by the board 
of directors dealing with the exercise 
of authority in the time of such emer-
gency, conducting the affairs of this as-
sociation. Any temporarily relocated 
place of business of this association shall 
be returned to its legally authorized lo-
cations as soon as practicable and such 
temporary place of business shall then 
be discontinued. 
(e) Providing for acting home offices. 
In case of, and provided that, because 
of war or warlike damage or disaster, the 
Home Office of this association Is unable 
temporarily to continue its functions, 
Branch, located in , 
shall automatically and without further 
action of this board of directors, become 
the "Acting Home Office of this Asso-
ciation"; that If by reason of said war 
or warlike damage or disaster, both the 
Home Office of this association and the 
said Branch of this associa-
tion are unable to carry on their func-
tions, then and in such case, the 
Branch of this association, 
located in , shall, without fur-
ther action of this board of directors, 
become the "Acting Home Office of this 
Association"; and if neither . 
Branch nor Branch can canry 
on their functions, then the 
Branch of this association, located in 
, shall, without further action 
of this board of directors, become the 
"Acting Home Office of this Association." 
The Home Office shall resume its func-
tions at its legally authorized location as 
soon as practicable. 
[24 FJ&. 8461, Oct. 20, 1:950; 24 F R 8971 
Nov. 4,1959] 
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CHAPTER 17 
INTEREST ON MORTGAGE LOAN 
RESERVE ACCOUNTS 
Sunset ,-v\ Section 63-55-7 provides that Title 7 terminates on July 1, 1989. 
Section 
7-17-1. 
7-17-2. 
7-17-3. 
7-17-4. 
7-17-5. 
7-17-6. 
Legislative intent 
Definitions. 
Lender to pay interest — Exceptions 
— Computation — Time for pay-
ment — Service charges prohib-
ited — Written agreement 
Options in lieu of reserve account — 
Notice by lender — Selection by 
borrower — Nonmterest-bearing 
reserve account 
Statements, 
Liability of lender for failure to pay 
taxes, insurance premiums or 
otiier charges-
Section 
7-17-7. 
7-17-8. 
7-17-9. 
7-17 10. 
Limit on amount borrower required 
to pay into account — Deficiency 
— Method of recouping and reme-
dies for default 
Damages for lender's violation of act 
— Limitations on recovery. 
Actions on accounts, established 
prior to 1979 •— Limitations on re-
covery. 
Applicability of act to accounts and 
actions thereon. 
7-17-1 Legislative in t en t 
It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act govern the 
rights, duties and Kabilities of borrowers and lenders with respect to reserve 
accounts established before and after the effective date of this act, 
History: L. 1979, ch- 154, § 1. 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 
act," referred to in this section, means Laws 
1979, Chapter 124, which appears as §§ 7-17-1 
to 7-17-10. 
Compiler's Notes- The term Effective 
date of this act," referred to in this section, 
means the efifective date of Laws 1979, Chapter 
124, i.e., July 1, 1979. 
Cross-References. — Depository institu-
tions exempt from escrow agent regulation, 
§ 31A-24-101. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative 
Survey — 1979, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155. 
C.J.S. — 47 C J.S. Interest and Usury; Con-
sumer Credit § 15. 
Key Numbers. Interest *=» 11. 
7-17-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Real estate loan" means any agreement providing for a loan se-
cured by an interest in real estate in this state containing a residential 
structure of not more than four housing units, at least one of whichls the 
primary residence of the borrower and includes, but is not limited to, 
agreements secured by mortgages, trust deeds, and conditional land sales 
contracts. 
(2) "Borrower" means any person who becomes obligated on a real es-
tate loan at the time of origination of such loan and includes mortgagors, 
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trustors under trust deeds and vendees under conditional land sales con-
tracts. 
(3) "Lender" means any person who regularly makes, extends or holds 
real estate loans and includes, but is not limited to, mortgagees, benefi-
ciaries under trust deeds and vendors .unDder conditional land sales con-
tracts and who regularly require or maintain reserve accounts. 
(4) "Person" includes an individual, a commercial bank, savings bank, 
building and loan corporation, savings and loan association, credit union, 
investment company, insurance company, pension fund, mortgage com-
pany, trust company, or any other organization making real estate loans. 
(5) "Reserve account" means any account, whether denominated es-
crow, impound, trust,~pledge, reserve or otherwise, which is established in 
connection with a loan secured by an interest in real estate located in this 
state, whether or not a real estate loan as defined in this chapter, and 
whether incorporated into the loan agreement or a separate document, 
whereby the borrower agrees to make periodic prepayment to the lender 
or its designee of taxes, insurance premiums or other charges pertaining 
to the property securing the loan and the lender or its designee agrees to 
pay the taxes, insurance premiums or other charges out of the account on 
or before their due date. 
(6) "Service charge" means any direct fee imposed in connection with 
the administration of a reserve account. 
(7) A loan is "made" when the lender makes its initial disbursement of 
the loan proceeds. 
History. L. 1979, chu 124, ?! ?.; 1981 ch. 15, 
$ 1 
7-17-3. Lender to pay interest — Exceptions — Computa-
tion — Time for payment — Service charges pro-
hibited — Written agreement, 
(1) Each lender requiring the establishment or continuance oi a reserve 
account in connection with an existing or future real estate loan shall pay 
interest on funds deposited in the account of at least blU% simple interest per 
annum, unless: 
(a) The reserve account is required by a governmental insurer or guar-
antor of the loan as a condition of insurance or guaranty; 
(b) The reserve account is maintained in connection with.a real estate 
loan in an original principal amount exceeding 80% of the lender's ap-
praised value of the property at the time the loan is made provided that 
when the principal balance of the loan is paid down to 80% this exception 
shall not apply; or 
(c) The payment of interest or other compensation to the jborrower for 
the use of funds deposited in a reserve account is prohibited by federal 
law or regulations. 
(2) The interest shall be computed as of the end of the calendar year on the 
average of the month end balances in the account for that calendar year or 
partial calendar year, except that in the event of payoff of the real^estate loan, 
interest shall be computed on the average month end balances in the account 
for the partial year ending at the end of the month preceding payoff. The * 
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interest shall, within 60 days after the end of each calendar yea r , at t h e 
election of the lender, be credited to the remaining ^ principal balance on t h e 
loan, paid to the borrower, his successors or assigns, or credited to t h e reserve 
account, except tha t in the event of payoff of the real estate loan, t h e interest 
shall be paid or credited to the borrower, his Successors or assigns within 30 
days after the date of payoff. 
(3) No lender shall require or impose a service charge for the adminis t ra-
tion of a reserve account. 
(4) Except as provided in this section, no lender shall be obligated to pay 
interest on or aqcount for the earnings fi-om fimds in any reserve account in 
connection with the real estate loan made or held after J u n e 30 ,1979 , unless 
an agreement in writing expressly so providing was executed by t h e borrower 
and lender. 
§ 2. 
I i i fB l .d i l,» 
ANALYSIS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Interest not required. 
Interest required. 
Interest not required. 
Where lender had required borrower to es-
tablish a reserve account prior to June 30, 
1979, and elected not to require borrower to 
maintain the account after July 1, 1979, and 
lender sent letter to borrower within the 
proper time frame giving proper notice that the 
account was no longer required and of bor-
rower's options under 7-17-4, and borrower did 
not respond to lender's letter, borrower was 
deemed to have selected to continue the re-
serve account without interest and without 
charge to him, and lender was not required to 
pay interest on deposits to the account made 
after June 30,1979. Nixon v. American Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 635 P.2d 24 (Utah 1981). 
Interest required. 
Lender must pay interest on the fimds depos-
ited in reserve accounts if it requires borrowers 
to continue to maintain reserve accounts on 
existing loans made prior to June 30 ,1979, or 
if it requires borrowers to establish reserve ac-
counts on new loans made sfter June 30,1979. 
Nixon v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 635 
P.2d 24 (Utah 1981). 
7-17-4. Options in lieu of reserve account — Notice b} 
lender — Selection by borrower — Noninterest-
bearing reserve account. 
U) A lender not requiring the establishment and maintenance ul a reserve 
account shall offer the borrower the following options: 
(a) The borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing reserve 
account to be serviced by the lender at no charge to the borrower, or 
(b) The borrower may manage the payment of insurance premiums, 
taxes and other charges for his own account. 
(2) The lender shall give written notice of the options to the borrower, (ij 
with respect to real estate loans existing on the effective date by notice mailed 
not more than 30 days after the effective date; (ii) with respect to r ea l estate 
loans made on or after the effective date by notice given at or pr ior to the 
closing of the loan. The notice shall clearly describe the options and s ta te that 
a reserve account is not required by the lender, that the borrower is legally 
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responsible for the payment of taxes, insurance premiums and other charges 
and that the notice is being given pursuant to this act. For real estate loans in 
existence on the effective date the borrower^must select one of the options 
prior to 60 days after the effective date. If no. option is selected prior to*60 days 
after the effective date the borrower will be deemed to have selected option 
(a), provided, however, that the borrower at a later time may select option.(b). 
For loans made on or after the effective date the borrower shall select one of 
the options at the closing. If the borrower selects option (a), the lender shall 
not be required to accoun,t for earnings, if any, on the account. 
(3) If the borrower who_selects option (b), of his successors or assigns, fails 
to pay the taxes, insurance premiums or other charges pertaining to the prop-
erty securing the loan prior to the delinquency date for such payments, the 
lender may require a reserve account without interest or other compensation 
for the use of the funds; provided, that the lender may not require a reserve 
account without interest or other compensation if (a) the borrower pays any 
delinquency within 30 days and (b) the borrower has not previously been 
delinquent in payment of taxes, insurance premiums or other charges. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 124, § 4. 
Meaning of **this act". — See note under 
same catchline following § 7-17-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Interest not required. maintain the account after July 1, 1979, and 
If the lender elected not to require the con- lender sent letter to borrower within the 
tinuance of a reserve account and gave proper proper time frame giving proper notice that the 
notice of that election along with available op- account was no longer required and of bor-
tions to the borrower within the month of July, rower's options under this section, and bor-
1979, then no interest is payable on deposits
 r o w e r ^ d n o t regp^d to lender's letter, bor-
made to the account between July 1,1979, and
 r o w e r w a s d e e m e d to h a v e Ge]ected to c ^ t ^ e 
the time when the notice was received by the
 t h e reBerve a c c o u n t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^ T ^ ^ J ' n ^ r ^ i . out charge to him, and lender was not required 
As^n, 635 R2d 24 (Utah 1981). ^ ^ Q n acxounTmade 
Where lender had required borrower to es- •r
 T nn „rt__ £.. _ 
tabiish a reserve account prior to June 30, f"J™ 'J^l'S^^'T^ ^ 
1979, and elected not to require borrower to **** ^ ^ 6 3 5 P ' 2 d ** ^ t a b 1981). 
7-17-5. Statements. 
Every lender shall furnish to the borrower, or his successors or assigns, 
without charge, within 60 days after the end of each calendar year, an item-
ized statement showing moneys (1) received for interest and principal repay-
ment and (2) received and held in or disbursed from a reserve account, if any. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 124, § 5. 
7-17-6, Liability of lender for failure to pay taxes, insur-
ance premiums or other charges. 
A lender administering a reserve account shall make timely payments of 
taxes, insurance premiums and other charges for which the account is estab-
lished, if funds paid into the account by the borrower, his successors or as-
signs, are sufficient for the payments. Negligent failure to make the payments 
550 
INTEREST ON MORTGAGE LOAX RESERVE ACCOUNTS 7-17-7 
required for taxes, insurance premiums and other charges as they become 
due, from available funds in the reserve account, shall subject the lender to 
liability for all damages directly resulting from the failure; provided that this 
sentence shall not deprive the lender of the right to present any defense it 
may have in any action brought to enforce the liability. Failure of the bor-
rower or his successors or assigns to deliver promptly to the lender all notices 
of tax assessments and insurance premiums or other charges, received by the 
borrower, his successors or assigns, shall relieve the lender from liability 
under this section. 
History: L. 1079, ch- 124, § 6. _ 
7-17-7. Limit on amount borrower required to pay into ac-
count — Deficiency — Method of recouping and 
remedies for default. 
No lender in connection with a real estate loan shall require a borrower, his 
successors car assigns, or a prospective borrower: 
(1) to deposit in any reserve account established in connection with the 
loan, prior to or upon closing, a sum exceeding the estimated total pay-
ments for taxes, insurance premiums or other charges which will be due 
and payable on the date of closing, and the pro rata portion thereof which 
has accrued, plus l/12th of the estimated total taxes, insurance premiums 
and other charges which will become due and payable during the 12-
month period beginning on the date of closing; or 
(2) to deposit in any reserve account in any month beginning after 
closing a sum exceeding l/12th of the total estimated taxes, insurance 
premiums, or other charges which will become due and payable during 
the 12-month period beginning on the first day of the month, except that: 
(a) If the lender determines there will be a deficiency on the due 
date, it may require additional monthly deposits in the reserve ac-
count of pro rata portions of the deficiency corresponding to the num-
ber of months from the date of the lender's determination of the 
deficiency to the date upon which the charges become due and pay-
able; 
(b) If the lender determines there is a deficiency on or after the due 
date, it may bill the borrower, his successors or assigns, for the defi-
ciency, which bill shall promptly be paid, or pay the deficiency, add 
that amount to the principal, or charge the reserve account, and 
require additional monthly deposits in the reserve account over the 
next 12 months to recoup the deficiency. If the borrower, his succes-
sors or assigns, fails to pay any amount billed by the lender to meet 
the deficiency, the lender may exercise any remedies for default con-
tained in the real estate loan document. If such failure to pay con-
tinues for 30 days after written notice to borrower, the lender may 
also terminate any obligation to pay interest or to otherwise pay 
compensation for the use of the funds in the reserve account. 
History: L 1979, ch. 124, § 7. 
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7-17-8. Damages for lender's violation of act — Limita-
tions on recovery. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a lender who violates this act is 
liable to the borrower, his successors or assigns-, for the actual damages suf-
fered by the borrower, his assigns or successors, or $100, whichever is greater. 
If an action is commenced, the prevailing party may be awarded reasonable 
attorney's fees as determined by the court. 
(2) A lender has no liability under this section if the court finds that writ-
ten demand for payment of the claim of the borrower, his successors or as-
signs, was made on the lender not less than 30 days before commencement of 
the action and that the lender tendered to the borrower, his successors or 
assigns, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount not less than the 
damages awarded 
(3) A lender may not be held liable under this section for a violation of this 
act if the lender shows that the violation was not intentional and resulted 
from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures to 
avoid such errors. 
(4) A reserve account established or maintained in violation of this act is 
voidable, at the option of the borrower, his successors or assigns, at any time, 
but shall not otherwise affect the validity of the loan, the security interest in 
the real property or any other obligation of the borrower. 
(5) No action under this section may be brought more than one year after 
the date of the violation. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 124, $ 8. 
Meaning of rtHns act". — See note under 
same catchline following § 7-17-1. 
7-17-9. Actions on accounts established prior to 1979 — 
Limitations on recovery. 
(1) With respect to any reserve account established prior, to July 1, 1979 
and for which no legal action is pending as of January 1, 1979, no recovery 
shall be had in any action brought to require payment of interest on, or other 
compensation for, the use prior to July 1, 1979, of the funds in such account 
unless: 
(a) An agreement in writing expressly so providing was executed by 
the borrower and the lender; or 
(b) The borrower, or his successors or assigns, establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence an agreement between the parties that the lender 
would pay interest on or to otherwise compensate the borrower for the use 
of the funds in such account Use in the loan documents of such words as 
"trustor "pledge" alone shall not establish the intent of the parties; and 
(c) There is no federal law or regulation prohibiting the payment of 
interest on or otherwise compensating the borrower for the use of the 
funds in such an account. 
(2) No action seeking payment of interest on or other compensation for the 
use of the funds in any reserve account for any period prior to July 1, 1979, 
shall be brought after June 30,1981 Any recovery in any such action shall be 
limited to the four-year period immediately preceding the commencement of 
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the action. No recovery shall be had in respect of any reserve account estab-
lished prior to July 1,1979 greater than if the provisions of § 7-17-3 of this act 
were applicable to such accounts. 
(3) With respect to any reserve account established prior to July 1,1979., an 
agreement in writing between the lender andihe borrower, or his successors 
or assigns, that (a) the provisions of § 7-17-S.of this act shall apply to all 
payments made subsequent to July 1,1979, or (b) the borrower may exercise, 
for the period subsequent to July 1, 1979, either of the options provided in 
§ 7-17-4 of this act, shall bar any recovery by the borrower, his successors or 
assigns, for interest on or other compensation for the use of the funds in such 
account for any period prior to July 1, 1979. 
History: I* 1979, ch. 124, § 9. 
7-17-10. Applicability of act to accounts and actions 
thereon. 
The provisions of this act shall apply: 
(1) to all reserve accounts; and 
(2) to all actions filled after January 1, 1979, to recover interest on or 
other compensation for the use of the funds in any reserve account 
whether or not the reserve accounts were established prior to or subse-
quent to July 1, 1979. 
History: L 1979, ch. 124, § 10. 
Meaning of 'this actf*. — See note under 
same catchline following § 7-17-1. 
CHAPTER 18 
FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 16, § 1) 
7-18-1 to 7-18-6. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1981, ch. 16, § 1 repeals ch. 4, §§ 1 to 6, relating to foreign financial 
$§ 7-18-1 to 7-18-6, as enacted by Laws 1980, institutions. 
CHAPTER 19 
ACQUISITION OF FAILING DEPOS-
ITORY INSTITUTIONS OR 
HOLDING COMPANIES 
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-7 provides that Title 7 terminates on. JuK 1, 1989. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
RICHARD HADSEH and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife9 for them-
selves and all others similarly 
situated
 9 
Plaintiffs, 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself 
and all others similarly 
situated, 
Defendants, 
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION, 
Intervener. 
C 77-0350 
ORDER 
Had in Untod S W B District 
Court Datnct c* Utih 
APR 19 1979 
PAUL L BADGER 
Clerk 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD MADSEK and NANCY 
MADSEN, 
Defendants. 
C 77-0111 
The above-entitled actions came before the court on 
April 6 and 9, 1979, for hearing on various not ions. The court, 
having considered the memoranda of counsel and the ir oral argu-
ments, enters the following order: 
(1) Mad sens' motion to remand in C 77-0350 i s denied. 
Federal question jurisdict ion i s present in .this act ion by virtue 
of 12 C.F.R. | 545.6-U(c) and the rule of North Davis Bank v. 
First National Bank of Lay ton» 457 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1972) 
(action is removable if "directly concerned with the construe 
of federal law and a determination of rights thereunder'1), 
action was timely removed in that Prudential filed a petitioi 
for removal on behalf of the defendant class within thirty dj 
after October 12, 1977, the date when Mad sens were granted L 
to amend their complaint to allege a defendant class. Prudei 
was entitled to remove on behalf of the defendant class with 
regard to the probability or improbability of eventual certi 
tion of the defendant class. 
(2) Madsens1 motion to dismiss for lack of federa 
question jurisdiction in C 77-0350 is denied. Important fed 
questions remain in this action. Madsens1 reliance on res j 
is inappropriate. Res judicata does not prevent this court 
considering federal issues that were previously ignored by t 
state courts in the course of this litigation. No subsequen 
lawsuit is involved here. This is simply a later stage of t 
same lawsuit that was before the state courts. 
(3) The Federal Home Loan Bank Board's motion foi 
to file an amicus brief is granted. The Board's brief, wh±c 
filed with the court on September 21, 1978, is received. 
(4) Madsens1 motion to continue disposition of Pi 
tial's motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment penc 
determination of class issues is denied. For reasons statec 
below, the court is persuaded that Madsens1 claim against 
Prudential is wholly without merit. Since it is manifest ti 
they cannot succeed on the merits, it is unnecessary to proc 
to class certification before resolving the controversy on t 
2-
merits. 
(5) Prudential's motions for summary judgment in both 
cases are granted. Under the federal preemption doctrine, Madsens 
have no claim against Prudential for interest on their escrow 
account. 12 C.F.R. § 545 .6 - l l ( c ) clearly precludes the re l i e f 
the Madsens are seeking. That regulation i s not subject to 
attack under the theory that i t retroactively abrogates vested 
rights. There i s no assurance that, under state law, Madsens 
at any time had any kind of right, much less an inviolable 
vested right, to receive interest on the escrow funds. More 
importantly, the regulation cited above does not appear to a l t er 
i 
the federal law applicable to. loans made before June 16, 1975, 
but instead appears to reaffirm the impact of 12 C.F.R. SS 544.1 
("association is not required to distribute earnings on short-
term savings accounts") and 541.5 (defining short-term savings 
account as including mortgage loan escrow accounts for taxes and 
insurance). 
(6) Intervenor's motion to strike defendant class 
allegations is granted. Under the holdings of La Mar v. H & B 
Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973) and Weiner v. 
Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the 
Madsens lack standing to sue defendants other than Prudential 
and cannot, as a matter of law, satisfy the Rule 23(a) require-
ments of typicality and adequate representation. Moreover, it 
appears to the court that certification of the defendant class 
would be futile in any event because of the great probability that 
defendant class members would take advantage of the "opting out" 
provisions of Rule 23(c). 
-3-
The conspiracy and juridical relationship exceptio 
the La Mar and Weiner doctrines are not applicable in this c 
No conspiracy or juridical relationship among defendants has 
pleaded or shown to exist . The vague al legation of an indus 
wide practice provides insufficient basis for finding a juri 
relationship. Moreover, the lending inst i tut ions in questic 
operate under diverse bodies of law and d i s t inc t ly separate 
regulatory agencies. 
(7) Madsens1 motion to maintain p la in t i f f and dei 
classes i s denied. The defendant class cannot be maintainec 
the reasons stated above with respect to the motion to stril 
class allegations and for the further reason that a defendat 
class action does not appear to be superior to other availal 
methods for the fair and ef f ic ient adjudication of the contj 
Since the defendant class cannot be maintained, neither can 
pla int i f f class survive except for those who are Prudential 
borrowers. Since those persons clearly have no cause of ad 
i t serves no useful purpose to cert i fy a c lass of Prudential 
borrowers. The court i s persuaded that no class certificat: 
i s now in effect . The cert i f icat ion order entered by the s 
court was null i f ied by the amendment of Madsens1 complaint 
allege a vastly broader class of p l a i n t i f f s . 
(8) Madsens1 motion to give notice to c lass memb 
and motion for leave to communicate with c i t izens committee 
denied. 
(9) All other motions pending i n these actions a 
dismissed as moot. 
- 4 -
For the reasons stated herein and for the further 
reasons stated by the court on the record on April 6 and 9, 
1979, 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this M day of April, 1979. 
Uu^LA/h^^ 
ALDON J . ANDERSON 
United State4^District Judge 
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4adsens' Motion to Amend Conclusion of 1 
.aw f 5 
4adsens' Amended Motion to Enlarge 
]!lass Definition 
*4adsens5 Motion for Sanctions 
4adsens' Motion to Amend Conclusion of 
,aw Tf 7 Based on New Case Law and 
teopen the Trial for the Limited Purpose of 
/taking Findings or Statute of Limitation 
ssues 
^ladsens' Second Motion to Amend 
Conclusion of Law f 5 
/ladsens' Motion to Amend Conclusion of 
,aw U 13 or Finding of Fact % 15 
Memorandum of Newly Uncovered 
mthority with Respect to Motion to Amend 
Conclusion of Law f 5 
dadsens' Notice to Submit for Decision the 
dternative Portions of Plaintiffs' Motion to 
unend Conclusion of Law f 5 
4adsens' Motion to Amend Decision of 
anuary 20, 1998 to Correct Internal 
^consistency 
ladsens' Objection to Master's Report and 
lotion to Change Masters 
ladsens' Motion to Amend Minute Entry-
)rder of March 20, 1998, or in the 
Jternative Motion to Enter Conclusion of 
aw Interpreting §7-17-10(2) 
Dated 12/3/96 1 
Dated 1/15/97 
Dated 1/24/97 
Dated 12/1/97 
Dated 12/1/97 
Dated 12/1/97 
Dated 1/20/98 
Dated 2/2/98 
Dated 2/19/98 
Dated 2/24/98 
Dated 4/24/98 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98 and 1 
Minute Entry dated 3/20/98 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 6/16/98 
Considered "resolved" by Order dated 1 
12/5/97, and no action taken 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98 
Stricken by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 3/20/98 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 4/17/98 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 4/17/98 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 6/18/98 1 
Madsens5 Motion to Settle Conflicting 1 
Orders 
Madsens' Petition for Writ of Mandamus to 1 
Utah Supreme Court (attacking the July 1, 
1979, damage cut-off period established by 
Conclusion of Law f 5), 
Madsens' Motion to Strike Conclusion of 
Law f 5 Based on Superceding Case Law 
Madsens' Motion to Judge Stirba to Appoint 
(Retired) Judge Rigtrup as Senior Master | 
Madsens' Objection to Master's Report and 
Motion to Change Masters 
Madsens' Petition for Permission to Appeal 
from Interlocutory Order to Utah Supreme 
Court, (challenging Conclusion of Law J^ 5) 
Motion To Amend Conclusion Of Law *| 4 
Based On Intervening Case Law 
Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law f 13 
Based Upon Year 2000 Case Law dated 
March 17, 2000 
Madsens' Motion to Vacate Order of March 
9, 1999 (arguing that Prudential's 1979 
Notice failed to comply with the Act 
Motion to Re-Define the Class Per Judge 
Croft's Class Certification Order of July 13, 
1977 
Motion to Vacate this Court's Minute 
Entry/Order of 8/6/01 Based on Fraud and 
Deceit 
1 Madsens' Motion to Disqualify the Master 
and That All of His Work Be Vacated 
1 Madsens' Renewed Motion to Disqualify 
\ +U<* A/fno+^*- H a c o r l o n T?PPPtit T l p V P l o t r m e n t S 
Dated 8/6/98 1 
Dated 9/10/98 
Dated 12/17/98 
Dated 12/24/98 
Dated 12/25/98 
Dated 3/26/99 
Dated 7/22/99 
Dated 3/17/00 
Dated 10/27/00 
Dated 4/18/01 
Dated 9/17/01 
Dated 9/20/01 
Dated 3/18/02 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 10/27/98 1 
Denied by Utah Supreme Court by Order I 
dated 10/26/98 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 3/9/99 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 3/9/99 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 4/17/98 
Denied by Utah Supreme Court by Order 
dated 6/3/99 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 10/7/99 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 5/16/00 
Denied by Mem. Decision dated 2/4/02 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 8/6/01 
Denied by Memorandum Decision dated 
2/4/01 
Denied by Order dated 1/2/02 
Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/15/03 
conclusion of Law ^ 5 Based Upon New 
Evidence and New Case Law 
Motion that the Court (not the Master) 
Compute an Award for "Aggregate Class 
Damages" 
Dated 12/16/02 Withdrawn 7/9/03 
Motion That Final Accounting Conform In 
All Respects To The Mandate Of The 
Supreme Court 
Dated 5/14/03 Denied by Order dated 1/23/04 
Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law f 13 
Based Upon Year 2003 Case Law and to 
Allow Prejudgment Interest _ ^ 
Dated 7/9/03 Denied by Order dated 1/23/04 
Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law If 13 
Based Upon Newly Decided Case of Smith 
v. Fairfax Realty, Inc. 
Dated 10/30/03 Denied by Order dated 1/23/04 
Motion to Amend Conclusions of Law f 4 
and Tf 9 Based on New Case Law 
Dated 11/20/03 Denied by Order dated 1/23/04 
Madsens5 Renewed Motion to Disqualify 
the Master 
Dated Denied by Order dated 1/23/04 
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account actually experiences. 
QL Is it Prudential fs practice to post revenues ! 
and expenses to.these individual escrow accounts? 
A. No, they have never done that, and that!s 
not the practice within the industry, as I understand 
it. It would require a tremendous amount of record-keeping; 
to post revenues and expenses to the individual escrow ; 
i 
accounts. But if one did, using a fully allocated basis, ! 
as I have done, or a modified allocated basis, it would ; 
show seasonal activity as depicted in Exhibit D-6. 
Q. Would it cost anything to post that revenue 
and expense to individual accounts? 
A. Yes, it would be very expensive, particularly 
back in the '60's and early ' 70's when much less of this 
activity was computerized than now is the case. 
Q. And what would be the effect if you do do 
that? 
A. If you do do it? 
ft Yes. 
A. To further compound the costs and thereby 
shift up the red line shown on Exhibit D-6, and further 
create deficits on the overall escrow servicing. 
ft Did Prudential incur costs and expenses 
on Mr. Madsen's escrow account each month during the 
15-year period? 
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1
 I A. Yes 
2 I Q. And have you made a computa t ion of t h a t ? 
3
 A. T h a t ' s b a s i c a l l y w h a t ' s r e v e a l e d i n 
4
 E x h i b i t D-6 
5 QL And what is Exhibit D-7? 
6
 A. D-7 shows the next difference on a cumulative 
7
 basis between the revenues and expenses throughout a 
8
 typical calendar year. The reason I say typical calendar 
9
 year is to again avoid criticism in choosing which year 
10 I would depict in the exhibit. I have combined all 
11 Januarys, all Februarys, all Marches for the entire period. 
12 And what it shows is that the horizontal line labeled 
13
 I with zeros would be a break-even point of servicing this 
escrow account throughout the year 
15 I The expenses early in the year exceed the 
16 I revenues, so the account starts in the red or in a deficit 
position of approximately $2 in January, and that further 
increases for two more months, and then going to the midpart 
of the year when the revenue-earning ability exceeds the 
costs for a period of time, which has the effect of eating 
away at this cumulative deficit until it hits a low point 
22
 J in the month of August. And thereafter, because the 
23
 I expenses start to increase, the deficit once again increase 
24
 I and hits a high point in December. 
25
 Q. So that cumulatively, accommodating each 
120 
one on top of the other through the year, there never 
is a profit earned on the Madsen account; is that correct? 
A. For the whole — collectively speaking, 
for the whole 15-month period, that's right. 
Q. All right. Now then, have you prepared 
a summary exhibit to illustrate your testimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And which one was that? 
A. That is Exhibit D-8. 
QL All right. That is your work? 
A. Yes. Well, I had assistants helping me 
on it, but I directed it, yes. 
QL I meant yours as opposed to Prudential's. 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Describe what we see in 
Exhibit D-8. What is it? 
A. Exhibit D-8 pulls together basically all 
of the types of revenue and expenses we've been discussing 
and determines the bottom-line loss experienced on the 
Madsen account for the period 1964 through 1978. It shoul 
be read going from left to right under the various steps 
which have been calculated to the ultimate conclusion 
depicted by the column on the far right. 
QL Let's start right at the top. It says 
"Madsen Escrow Profit/Loss, All Investment Securities." 
121 
The charts are m the courtroom, the summary of the 
2 I records is in the courtroom, 
3 Q. But the original documents you looked at, 
4 the ones up m the granite vaults and so on, and the 
5 original documents you looked at to prepare these charts, 
they are not m the courtroom, are they? 
A. They are in the courtroom. 
Q. Where? 
A. In brief cases and boxes. 
Q. Every document you looked at is in the 
courtroom? 
k All that come to mind, yes. 
Q. Then Ifll withdraw that portion. I would 
like to have the chance to have a break and examine those 
documents for purposes of cross-examination. 
But the first two bases for my objection 
stand; that is, that there is a hearsay objection. He 
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18 relied on out-of-court discussions with many people, and 
the out-of-court experiment. He relied on walking through 
and perhaps a time-m-motion study, I guess. 
THE COURT: It's overruled. It goes to 
weight and credibility. You may answer. 
Q, (By Mr. Palmer) What is your opinion? 
A. My opinion is: Analyzing the profitability 
25 as the differende between revenue and expenses, it shows 
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might be multiple steps, but that would be a very modest 
numbering, something totaling — well, something less 
than ten steps per year, whereas we have seen a total 
of seventy-four steps required for an average escrow 
account. 
Q. So how does the cost of handling escrow 
accounts with respect to making any profit off them 
compare to the cost of handling passbook savings accounts' 
k It doesn!t compare very well, but the 
disparity is that there's much higher cost in handling 
escrow accounts than in handling passbook accounts. 
MR. PALMER: You may cross-examine. 
Oh, excuse me. I'll offer the exhibits, 
please. 
MR. DeBRY: I have the same objection I 
made earlier, and the Court has already ruled on that. 
But I would like to preserve that objection. 
MR. PALMER: Exhibits D-3 through 8. 
THE COURT: The record may note the 
exception. The exhibits will be received. You may cross, 
MR. DeBRY: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DeBRY: 
Q, Mr. Norman, on direct examination you told 
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escrows for the whole class and comes up with a nice 
round number of $13 million that we have stolen from 
the public. The inquiry here is as to the earnings on 
Mr. Madsen's account. This exhibit should be stricken. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
& (By Mr. DeBry) Would you like to explain 
quickly what it is? I'm not sure. 
A. It's an accumulation for all the escrow 
fund balances, not only Mr. Madsen's but for all. I 
used the very low T-bill yield which was the lowest 
computation that I made. Compared the average expense 
rate and the net earnings, multiplied it by the total 
escrow funds and arrived at a balance which was accumulated! 
by years. 
MR. DeBRY: Thank you. 
I think. 
your Honor. 
Q. 
charts you ha 
MR. PALMER: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PALMER: 
MR. DeBRY: 
MR. PALMER: 
THE COURT: 
Is it offered? 
Pardon? 
Is it offered? 
It's offered and received, 
I object to it as irrelevant, 
Received. 
(By Mr. DeBry) In going through these 
ve computed the lost earnings or profits in 
3 
•*. 
two or three different methods, do you have an opinion 
as a cost accountant with respect to which of these various 
methods most accurately reflects the actual lost earnings 
to Mr. Madsen? 
k If I had to choose one — they are all 
very similar and come out within $100 of each other — 
it would be the amount they actually earned on their 
investments that they actually made. 
Q. Which chart is that? 
THE COURT: Actual weighted average. 
THE WITNESS: Average Prudential yields 
on Schedule 8. 
QL (By Mr. DeBry) Explain why you believe 
that's the most accurate computation and if you believe 
that's a conservative figure. 
A. Because of the commingling of the deposits 
once they get in the bank, there's really no tracing 
any one kind of dollars versus another kind of dollar. 
They are all commingled and invested in various instruments 
and earn an average yield. So it's impossible to trace 
one dollar versus another dollar and say that this is 
what they earned on their fungible money, i.e., deposits 
that were received in the bank. 
Qi Do you believe that's conservative as 
compared with other possibilities? 
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«! J Q. I don't want to interrupt the witness, 
2 I but I keep getting argument. ! 
3 | THE COURT: It's not argument. He's ;just 
4 I explaining his methods and how he arrived at it. ; 
5 MR. PALMER: Okay. 
6 THE WITNESS: Should I continue, your Honor? 
7 THE COURT: You may 
8 THE WITNESS: For a dollar of passbook 
9 J savings that comes m , the institution pays a passbook 
rate, which is the cost to them plus they pay their 
operating costs and they earn a profit 
In this particular case, in an escrow depositj 
they don't pay the passbook rate, they pay the operating 
expenses. So you take what they earned from that escrow 
deposit, subtract the operating expenses and if it costs 
about the same to handle passbook savings as it does 
•17 I to handle escrow accounts, you should arrive at the same 
18 difference as what the institution pays on its passbook 
•J9 savings. It all makes sense to me, anyway 
20 I Q> (By Mr. Palmer) Assuming that it costs 
the same to handle passbook accounts as it does for escrow 
22 | deposits? 
23 I A. That's correct. That's one of the fundamental 
24 I assumptions. 
25 & And Mr. Stewart, do you know of any study 
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A. T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
Q. And does the i n t e r e s t and dividend income 
a l so inc lude the i n t e r e s t earned on mortgages? 
A. Yes, s i r . I 
Q. And in your computations on Schedule 5, 
you haven't figured any cost factor whatsoever? 
A. The average passbook amount is certainly 
a cost factor to the savings and loan. They pay that 
to depositors. 
Q. Show me on Schedule 5 where you went through 
and took out any money for employee costs. 
A. Schedule 5 was used to determine what the 
spread was between average passbook, which is the cost 
of the deposits coming in and the amount earned. In 
the later schedule we did subtract the costs which I 
calculated by taking the total variable costs and dividing 
it by the total deposits. 
Q. And Schedule 6, again, doesn't have a cost 
deduction except as you might argumentatively say that 
it is included in passbook yield. 
A. That's correct. Thats1 just to make the 
Court aware of what earnings would be if you just took 
the passbook weight. 
THE COURT: And that's in the wonderful 
land of assumptions, isn't it? 
THE WITNESS: That's right, your Honor. 
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1 entitled, at minimum, to an offset against their indebtednej 
2 or I'd assume it would follow, a disgorgement of those 
3 profits, 
4 I view that as the law of the case, and 
5 inescapable. I also don ft view this, even though cast 
6 in the context of unjust enrichment, it gives me the 
7 prerogative of trying the case based upon just and unjust 
8 in terms of enrichment. 
9 The Supreme Court says that the Madsens 
10 are entitled to an accounting for profits, so that is 
^ what I think I am obliged to follow. Ifm not troubled 
12 at all by burden of proof. As far as I see day in and 
13 day out, the concept was told over and over and over 
14 to me as a lawyer, as I practiced in these courts, by 
15 D. Frank Wilkins in his rule, which was "He who alleges, 
16 must prove." 
17 That is the basic fundamental rule in this 
18 case. And the Court, given those limitations and 
19 restrictions, had been tortured in terms of the-decisional 
20 process in this matter. Whether one becomes an expert 
21 or one does not, it's not a requirement or prerequisite 
22 that you abandon common sense. Mr. Norman knows that 
23 I graduated in accounting. So I do have some background. 
24 I think too much, at times, is made of 
25 the fact that it almost rises to a point of science rather 
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ss, 
1 i than an art, though you use the term art. And I guess 
2 I the best common sense example of why I perceive there 
3 is some overkill in the area is that I was a farm boy, 
4 and farmers, with the corner of their shopping bag and 
5 a lead pencil, could do more in 15 minutes grappling 
5 I with weather, grappling with soil conditions, grappling 
7 with fertilizing problems, grappling with a choice of 
8 seeds and all that they have to program in, and still 
persist in that activity day in and day out. And that's 
something which seems to me could confound enough cost 
accountants to circle the globe. It's not a science, 
itfs an exercise in judgment. 
And it seems to me that if the conclusions 
that are followed by the cost accounting approach are 
followed, management would have failed a long time ago. 
The funds are and have been of benefit to Prudential 
17 I Federal Savings & Loan over the years. They provide 
18 a base over which to spread costs. They provide a hedge 
ig against default, and provide security. 
20 1 realize there are some federal regulations 
2«| about that, though Prudential, as did other savings and 
22 loans, banks, and other institutions, followed the state 
23 statute in terms of turning that practice around. And 
24 as I recall, part of the regulation provided that state 
25 law could be files. But if in the last years when costs, 
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1 as you indicated, Mr. Norman, went up enormously — as 
2 they did — Prudential Federal, if it really strictly 
3 followed that analysis, would have somehow found a lower 
4 cost alternative rather than keep a loss leader. I give 
5 them more credit than that. 
6 There were certainly triple A accounts 
that weren't collection problems in those accounts. And 
8 I as to those, I would submit that they would have found 
9 some sort of service bureau, or whatever, to perform 
that function. The generation of deposits, the generation 
of loans are essential productive features of their 
bueiness. The function of escrow accounts is a nonessential 
function, other than as they perceive it to be essential 
by virtue of federal regulations. And the process of 
billing, receiving payments, and many of those other 
16 I things is not greatly different,with or without escrow 
17 accounts. 
18 The Court is persuaded of that clearly 
19 and convincingly by a preponderance of the evidence. 
20 It follows as night the day. 
2i I had experience as a young lawyer, going 
22 out and opening an office, of doing a lot of collection 
23 work. You do get established, and one lawyer and one 
24 good secretary can push an awful lot of volume and paper, 
25 and that was before word processing and the fine things 
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1 that lawyers have today. We understood that there ere 
2 lithographs and other ways to maybe accomplish these 
3 things in a less efficient way, but nonetheless, you 
4 learn in a short time how to handle great volumes of 
5 paperwork with a very small amount of people 
6 I'm convinced in a very persuasive way 
7 I that the function of servicing escrow accounts is not 
8 j a monumental task, and that it can be achieved by a relativje 
9 I small amount of people. Once you shift from an escrow 
environment to a nonescrow environment, many of the function 
that are performed in that department aren't going to 
be greatly diminished. They are going to keep the building], 
they are going to keep the data processing capabilities, 
14 I and I'm really persuaded by Mr. Stewart's analysis that 
15 if you have an appropriate allocation, it more common-
15 sensically follows that those costs be attributed to 
17 the productive aspects of the business. 
18 It does not appear to be rational at all, 
19 as per Exhibit 8, that costs would escalate in that fashion] 
20 and they would still maintain that function without making 
21 some big corrections. 
22 I think Mr. Norman and Mr. Stewart would 
23 both recognize the judgment aspect of any allocation 
24 process, and I think they would both recognize that they 
25 neither one may have the perfect solution or all of the 
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answers. 
I think they both would be candid, and 
I respect them for both being honest and upfront. If 
the computerized and mechanization process added such 
a heavy burden to the cost, it would have been a better 
6 management decision to persist with shoe boxes and a 
mechanical process, rather than allowing the costs to 
double in a short period of time when the benefit to 
be gained was as minimal as it was. 
I think, moreover, Mr. Stewart's analysis 
of the escrow account balances were, as I recall, in 
the range of 20 per cent lower. I donft know whether 
that's more accurate or less accurate than your analysis, 
Mr. Norman, except that it demonstrates a conservative 
bias in favor of Prudential Federal rather than Mr. Madsen, 
There was something said about working 
capital, that it also seems to me there is — I think 
it's maybe unrealistic and idealistic to think that there 
is instantaneous management of those funds, and there 
may be a little bias in the analysis of Mr. Stewart, 
and there is some justification of working capital slack. 
Moreover, given the high interest rates and the levels 
we're talking about, management doesn't let large amounts 
of uninvested funds go for 60 days, and they are moving 
them into a mode of investment where they can derive 
505 
daily yield-kind of investments at times to keep the 
funds working. As for the assignment of a lot of costs, 
Ifm impressed that the building is a sunk cost, and the 
assignment of a large amount of that really doesn't track 
the function. 
Ifm convinced that advertising to generate 
the productive aspect of the business; namely, loans 
and deposits, doesnft have as part of its function to 
generate escrow business. They are not in the business, 
really, of providing escrow business as a primary function 
And I think the bulk of the high level management decisions) 
really arenft involved in managing day-to-day escrow 
decisions. It seems to the Court that most of that is 
clerical and doesn't require the highest order of skills. 
The high order of skills are more required, 
though, in terms of investment decisions and things of 
that kind. So to apportion a substantial portion of 
that to that process appears to the court to be non founded| 
in common sense. 
There were other specific things that I 
think are of similar rationality as far as I view the 
overall record. If the Court feels it had an unjust 
enrichment kind of case, I think the Court would find 
the decision easy. But my perception is that I am locked 
in by a decision of the Supreme Court that simply found 
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it to be a pledge, and that those funds had to be accounted 
2 for to the customer. And it's that plain and simple, 
3 and it's put me in a tortuous kind of position that, 
4 J notwithstanding my underlying biases and feelings, I 
feel that I have no choice. 
Q I I think there have been errors in both 
7 analyses in one way or another, but in thinking about 
o it all, the court finds and concludes that the approach 
g that Mr. Stewart took in his Schedule 7, which uses the 
short-term T-bill rate more closely approximates the 
short period of turnover with escrow accounts and the 
investment options. And the court finds it reasonable 
to conclude that on the Madsen account, during the period 
from March 3, 1971 through June 30, 1979, that there 
was total cumulative earnings on the Madsen account earned 
of $109.43. And that it would further be appropriate, 
as a finding,that as a matter of fact, that the Madsens 
18 I would have a total cumulative effect of earnings on those 
19 funds bringing the total to $134.70. 
20 MR. PALMER: $134.70? 
2i THE COURT: Yes. Plaintiffs, accordingly, 
22 are awarded judgment for $134.70 plus allowable costs. 
23 And with respect to the mechanics, I haven't worked out 
24 anything with respect to the overall class impact it 
25 would have. So the issue of what the ramifications are 
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